Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

William Anthony Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, a
Utah corporation, dba Heritage Honda, and O.
Bryan Wilkinson, and Jeffrey J. Wilkinson :
Appellant's and Cross-Appellee's Second Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Donald J. Winder; Gerry B. Holman; Winder & Haslam; Attorneys for Defendant.
Michael N. Zundel; James A. Boevers; Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler; Kent B. Linebaugh; Jones,
Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Kraatz v. Wilkinson, No. 20010598 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3390

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

WILLIAM ANTHONY KRAATZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant and
Cross-Appellee,
vs.

APPELLANTS AND
CROSS-APPELLEES
SECOND BRIEF

HERITAGE IMPORTS, a Utah
corporation, dba HERITAGE HONDA,
Defendant-Appellee and
Cross-Appellant,

Case No. 20010598-CA
Priority No. 15

and 0. BRYAN WILKINSON, and
JEFFREY J. WILKINSON,
Defendants.

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Donald J. Winder
Gerry B. Holman
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone (801) 322-2222
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee and
Cross-Appellant Heritage Imports
u

\
]
J

FILED
tah Court of Appeals
W

y

i 7 2002

Paulett© Stagg

Clerk of the Court

Michael N. Zundel
James A. Boevers
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone (801-524-1000
Kent B. Linebaugh
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK &
McDONOUGH
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone (801) 521-3200

'i
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant and
Cross-Appellee William Anthony Kraatz

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,

FILED

Utah Court of Appeals

AUG 0 7 2002
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
William Anthony Kraatz,
Plaintiff, Appellant and
Cross-appellee.

Paulette Stagg
Clerk of the Court

ORDER
Case No. 20010598-CA

v.
Heritage Imports, a Utah
corporation dba Heritage
Honda, 0. Bryan Wilkinson, and
Jeffery J. Wilkinson,
Defendants, Appellees
and Cross-appellants.

This matter is before the court upon the motion filed by
appellant and cross-appellee on July 17, 2002, to allow the
filing of an over-length brief. Appellee and cross-appellant did
not respond or otherwise object to the motion.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant and cross-appellee's
motion to allow filing of an over-length brief is granted.
Appellee and cross-appellant's reply brief shall be filed within
thirty (30) days of the date of this order.
Dated this ~)( day of August, 2002.
FOR THE COURT

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OVER CROSS-APPEAL
Final Judgment was entered on June 29, 2001 [Addendum B to Appellant's
Opening Brief ("Aplt. Add. B"), Record on Appeal ("R.") 5037-39]. Plaintiff William
Anthony Kraatz ("Kraatz") timely filed his notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court
on July 17, 2001 (R. 5047-48), pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 4(a) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-2-2(3)0).
Defendant Heritage Imports ("Heritage") timely filed its notice of cross-appeal to
the Utah Supreme Court on July 26, 2001 (R. 5051-52), pursuant to Utah R. App. P.
4(d) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0)-

Tne

Utah Supreme Court transferred this

appeal to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has
jurisdiction over Heritage's cross-appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)ij).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL
Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of
attorney fees awarded to Kraatz.
Standard of Review: Because the trial court is in a better position than the
appellate court to gauge the quality and efficiency of the legal representation and the
complexity of the litigation, the amount of a fee award is reviewable only for abuse of
discretion. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998). The party
appealing from the amount of the fee award must first marshal all of the evidence in
support of the amount of the award, and then show why that evidence is legally
insufficient. Id.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Where compensable and non-compensable claims are closely related and require
proof of the same facts, it is not an abuse of discretion to award fees incurred in
proving all of the related facts. Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 1999 Utah Ct.
App. 109, 1f 20, 978 P.2d 470, cert, den., 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). It is also not an
abuse of discretion to award a fee amount greater than the amount of the damage
award. Valcarce, supra, 961 P.2d at 317; Cabrera v. CottrelL 694 P.2d 622, 625
(Utah 1985).
Citation to the Record Showing Preservation of the Issue: As will be shown
below, most of Heritage's arguments contesting the amount of the fee award were not
made in the trial court, are raised for the first time on appeal, and thus may not be
considered by this Court. See, Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission, 945 P.2d 125,
129-130 (Utah App. 1997), cert, den., 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ON CROSS-APPEAL
Kraatz filed his Motion for Determination of Damages and Attorney Fees and
Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Remand, a supporting Memorandum and Appendices,
and a supporting Affidavit of Michael N. Zundel ("First Zundel Aff.") on
September 26, 2000 (R. 4331-4606; 5060-5125). Kraatz sought attorney fees of
$380,180.00 through remand after the first appeal. (R. 5061) This amount included a
reduction of $15,691.50 in non-assessable fees. (R. 5107-08; 4336) The First Zundel
Aff. and Volume 3, Appendix C (R. 4331-4606, 5102-5121) set forth the legal basis
for the fee award, the nature of the work performed by each attorney, the number of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-2- may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

hours spent to prosecute the case through remand, established the reasonableness of the
fees for comparable legal services, and separately stated the hours by persons other
than attorneys, for the time spent, work completed and hourly rate billed, all as
required by Rule 4-505 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
Heritage did not file an affidavit contesting the reasonableness of Kraatz's
attorney fees or a motion to strike the First Zundel Aff. Nevertheless, in response to
objections in Heritage's Memorandum in Opposition (R. 4635-41), Kraatz's Reply
Memorandum reduced his fee claim by another $15,146.14, to $365,033.86.
(R. 4744-47, 4749-50, 4756-57) Heritage's Memorandum in Opposition did not
contest the reasonableness of Kraatz's attorney fees incurred on appeal. (R. 4635-41)
Thereafter, Kraatz's counsel submitted supplemental affidavits also complying
with Rule 4-505, as to post-remand fees (R. 4782-4810). Again, Heritage filed no
opposing affidavits or motions (or any other objection to the post-remand fees). The
trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Kraatz's motion on March 26, 2001 [March
26, 2001 Transcript ("Tr."), R. 5059]. At that hearing, Heritage did not offer any
evidence in opposition to Kraatz's fee request. (14.) However at the hearing, Kraatz's
counsel offered to testify, and Kraatz offered ten additional exhibits in support of his
attorney fee claim, which were received into evidence without objection [R. 4811
("March 26, 2001 Ex."); March 26, 2001 Tr., R. 5059, pp. 2-4]. By that time,
Kraatz's attorney fee claim had increased to $432,941.36 (R. 4948).
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On June 13, 2001, the trial court entered Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law determining that Kraatz was entitled to attorney fees of
$432,941.36, consisting of $225,210.36 through trial, $139,823.50 for the first appeal
(for a total of $365,033.86 through the first appeal), and $67,907.50 post-appeal.1 (R.
5002, 5008)2 On June 29, 2001, the trial court entered a Judgment for Kraatz and
against Heritage that included this fee award. (Aplt. Add. B, R. 5037-39)
STATEMENT OF FACTS ON CROSS-APPEAL
On or about October 23, 1992, Mr. Kraatz and the law firm of Jardine
Linebaugh & Dunn ("JLD") entered into a written Attorneys Fee Agreement pursuant
to which Mr. Kraatz agreed to pay JLD a fee equal to $10,000.00, plus a contingent fee
equal to one-third of his recovery in this case, including recovery of attorney fees
awarded under his employment agreement. This agreement was applicable to all
1

March 26, 2001 Ex. 10 erroneously shows the post-appeal fee amount as
$69,284.40, and the total fee amount as $434,318.26. This is because the exhibit
shows Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler's post-remand fees to be $53,004.40, rather than
the $51,627.50 in Mr. Zundel's supplemental affidavit (R. 4798), accounting for the
$1,376.90 discrepancy. However, the correct $67,907.50 amount of post-remand fees
and $432,941.36 in total fees are shown in Plaintiff's Proposed Amended Findings and
Conclusions (R. 4948) and were awarded by the trial court.
2

Although the trial courts' findings and conclusions on attorney fees are not
detailed, Heritage's opening brief does not contest the adequacy of the findings and
conclusions. Moreover neither detailed findings nor an evidentiary hearing were
required in light of Heritage's failure to file affidavits in opposition to the affidavits of
plaintiff's counsel, or to offer any other evidence in opposition to the reasonableness of
the amount of Kraatz's fee claim. See, Estate of Covington v. Josephson. 888 P.2d
675, 679 (Utah App. 1994), cert, den., 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). See also. Flying
Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co.. 776 P.2d 618, 622 (Utah 1989) (findings
unnecessary if evidence is undisputed).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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proceedings through one trial. (March 26, 2001 Ex. 2, ff 3 and 7) By letter
agreement of April 2, 1999 (the "April 1999 Letter"), Mr. Kraatz and JLD modified
the original Attorneys Fee Agreement, and Mr. Kraatz agreed to pay JLD an amount
equal to one-third of his recovery in this case, or the total amount of attorney fees
awarded by the court, whichever is greater. (March 26, 2001 Ex. 3, p. 1)
Following the dissolution of JLD, by letter agreement of March 2, 2000 Mr.
Kraatz and the law firms of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler and Jones, Waldo, Holbrook
& McDonough agreed that such firms would continue to represent Mr. Kraatz in this
case, by assuming all of JLD's duties and obligations and on the same fee basis as
stated in the April 1999 Letter. (March 26, 2001 Ex. 4, p. 1)
The total amount of attorney fees attributable to Kraatz's breach of contract,
claim against Heritage, calculated solely on an hourly basis, is $432,941.36, consisting
of the following: (1) $225,210.36 through trial and (2) $139,823.50 on the first appeal
(for a total of $365,033.86 through the first appeal), plus (3) post-appeal fees of
$67,907.50 incurred in connection with the determination of Mr. Kraatz's damages,
attorney fees, and costs and expenses, on remand. See, n. 1, supra. Of these
categories, the fees through trial are broken down into the following subcategories:
Description of Work

Hours

Pre-filing Case Assessment
Pleading Drafting
Settlement Negotiation
Discovery and Analysis Regarding Damages and
Nullification of Heritage's "For Cause" Defenses

81.30
28.10
73.70
1,207.97
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Dollars
$

9,279.50
2,883.25
10,780.00
130,557.75

Pretrial Motions
Trial Brief Drafting
Direct Trial Preparation and Trial Presentation
Post-Trial Findings and Conclusions
Subtotal

11.50
123.00
501.05
74.80

1,725.00
11,070.90
52,776.75
6.037.21

2,101.42

$225,210.36

(R. 5107-08, 4336, 4756-57, 4948)
The amounts stated for the categories of Pre-Filing Case Assessment, Pleading
Drafting, Direct Trial Preparation and Post-Trial Findings and Conclusions are the
amounts stated in Mr. Kraatzfs Reply Memorandum in the district court on the issues
of damages and attorney fees (R. 4744-47, 4749-50), based on Heritage's objections in
its Memorandum in Opposition (R. 4635-41). By those adjustments, Mr. Kraatz's
original request for fees was reduced by $15,146.14. (R. 4756-57, 4969-72A) This
reduction is reflected in the above numbers.
Heritage chose to defend against this action by making numerous allegations to
the effect that Mr. Kraatz was discharged for "cause." In order to prevail against such
allegations and also to prove Mr. Kraatz's damages, it was necessary for counsel for
Mr. Kraatz to understand, discover and be prepared to present all of the evidence
necessary to prevail on the issues of both liability and damages. (R. 5111-15, 4950)
Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to segregate the attorney services rendered in
prevailing against Heritage's allegations of discharge for cause, from those services
devoted to plaintiff's other claims against Heritage and its co-defendants, because the
proof overlaps. (R. 1-41,5107,4950)
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I

Nevertheless, as indicated above, counsel for Mr. Kraatz properly excluded fees
incurred solely in connection with the pursuit of claims for which attorney fees are not
recoverable, because they were against the individual defendants, or because they
pertained to claims upon which Mr. Kraatz did not prevail. (R. 5107-08, 4336,
4744-47, 4749-50) For example, counsel pro-rated the number of pages in the trial
brief devoted to tort claims against individuals and a separate cause of action for bad
faith. Six pages of the 33 page trial brief, or 18% of the total pages, represented
$2,430.18 of attorneys' time based on a pro rata distribution of time per page, which
was subtracted from the total amount claimed for the brief. (R. 4745)
Counsel for Mr. Kraatz made similar prorations in connection with their work
on the post-trial proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and their trial

,

preparation and trial presentation. For example, counsel reviewed the trial transcript
and determined whether a witness's main purpose was to pursue tort claims against the
individuals. In one instance, counsel estimated that 50% of J. Wilkinson's 42 pages of
testimony, or 21 pages, which is 3.01% of the total 697 pages of trial transcript, should
be excluded. (R. 4747) Thus, out of $58,737.25 in trial preparation and presentation
fees, $1,769.70 (3.01%) was excluded. (WJ Other amounts based upon similar
calculations were also excluded. (R. 5107-08, 4336, 4744-47, 4749-50, 4756-57)
Some specifically identifiable factors giving rise to the extensive legal services
provided to Mr. Kraatz through the time of trial are: (a) Heritage's failure to cooperate
during the discovery phase in this case, as evidenced by the trial court's Order
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
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Compelling Discovery dated June 2, 1993 (for which attorney fees in an amount to be
determined later were ordered as a sanction) (R. 243-46); (b) the numerous unmerited
accusations Heritage made against Mr. Kraatz; (c) the aggressiveness of Heritage's
attack upon the enforceability of the Contract (e.g., Heritage's attempt to equate the
Contract's use of the term "refusal" with "failure"); and (d) the fact that almost all of
the available witnesses were biased against Mr. Kraatz because they were: (i) part of
the Wilkinson family; (ii) still employed by Heritage at the time of trial, or (iii)
business associates of Larry Miller, the majority shareholder of Heritage (R. 5111-12).
Because of the complexity of the case, it was necessary to involve multiple
attorneys in the representation of Kraatz. The complexity of the case also required a
certain amount of repetition, rethinking, brainstorming and experimentation, which was
not duplicative or unnecessary. The joint efforts of the attorneys and staff involved in
the representation of Kraatz were essential to an effective presentation of his case.
(R. 5113,5115)
The amount in controversy in this case was, in the beginning, $3,507,980.00 as
stated in the Complaint. (R. 8) That amount was reduced over time because Mr.
Kraatz was able to mitigate his damages by finding continuously improving
employment, and Mr. Kraatz agreed to limit his damages claims to those damages
accruing during the initial five year term of the Contract. His claim for damages for
lost wages and benefits and stock appreciation rights totaled $553,485.55 by the time of
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trial, after mitigation and exclusive of pre-judgment interest, costs, expenses and
attorney fees. (R. 5112)
All of the numerous depositions taken prior to trial were necessary either to
ascertain the factual basis, if any, of Heritage's defenses to Mr. Kraatzfs contract
claims, or to establish a foundation for Mr. Kraatz's contract damage claims, often
from out of state witnesses. Heritage identified, in its Second Amended Answer to
Plaintiff's Interrogatories, 30 witnesses who had information relevant to this case.
Many of the witnesses deposed were persons identified by Heritage as persons having
knowledge of facts supporting Heritage's allegations, and were friendly to Heritage.
(R. 5117-18) In some instances it was necessary for more than one of Kraatz's
attorneys to attend a deposition, and on some occasions more than one attorney for
Heritage would also attend a single deposition. (R. 5115)
In prosecuting Mr. Kraatz's claims, it was necessary for his counsel to copy and
examine thousands of documents evidencing the cash flows of Heritage over a period of
several years prior to and after the discharge of Mr. Kraatz. This was necessary in
order to: (a) defend Mr. Kraatz against Heritage's allegations of misfeasance; and (b)
establish the true value and earning capability of the dealership, after making the proper
adjustments necessitated by Bryan Wilkinson's personal use of corporate financial
resources (e.g., R. 2170-71, 2177-78, 2181-82 and Ex. 329, Tab. 2, showing that for
the years 1989 through 1992 Bryan Wilkinson took as much as $281,877.00 out of the
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business for his personal benefit, over and above the more than $240,000.00 reported
in W-2 income for him for each of those years). (R. 5112)
At the conclusion of the trial the trial court acknowledged the demonstrated skill
and competence of counsel for Mr. Kraatz with the following remark on page 2462 of
the record: "I do want to congratulate both counsel. This case has been conducted, in
my estimation, in a very professional, competent fashion and I want to commend you
all. I say both counsel. I mean all counsel." The reputations of counsel for Mr.
Kraatz are very good in the legal community, with Mr. Linebaugh enjoying a rating of
AV by Martindale Hubbell, and Mr. Zundel enjoying a rating of BV at the time of
trial. Both counsel are experienced attorneys who have been practicing for many years
in this community. (R. 5107, 4333 )
As to the $139,823.50 in attorney fees incurred on Mr. Kraatz's appeal, plaintiff
offered into evidence his briefs on appeal and the supporting appendices (March 26,
2001 Ex. 5 through 9). Plaintiffs appeal addressed only the issue of Heritage's
liability for breach of the express terms of the Contract, and all such fees are
recoverable under the Contract. (Id.) The factual issues on appeal were complex,
requiring counsel to painstakingly marshal all of the evidence in the record. Also, it
was necessary to involve more than one of Kraatz's attorneys in this process.
(R. 5113) The legal issues on appeal were also complex. (March 26, 2001 Ex. 5
through 9)
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The $67,907.50 in post-remand fees (all of which are recoverable under the
Contract) were broken down into the following subcategories:
Time spent by the firm of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler:
Description of Work

Hours

Amount

Communications with client re status of case
and settlement discussions with client and
opposing counsel

18.30

$ 3,359.50

Breakout attorney fees into categories

15.00

2,382.00

126.70

21,676.50

Assemble Appendices to Motion

40.40

4,988.00

Draft Reply Memorandum

40.60

7,860.00

Assemble and analyze costs and expenses
recoverable under the contract

19.40

2,045.00

Research pre-judgment interest issues

19.50

2,523.50

6.10

1,076.50

30.90

5,716.50

316.90

$51,627.50

Time spent by the firm of Jones, Waldo
Holbrook & McDonough through 3/3/01

61.70

12,280.00

Time spent by the firm of Jones, Waldo
Holbrook & McDonough after 3/4/01

17.00

3,400.00

Draft Motion and Memorandum for Determination
of Damages, Attorney Fees and Supporting
Affidavits

Research alternative CPI adjustment of damages
Draft Proposed Findings and Conclusions
Subtotal
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Estimated post-hearing time to be devoted
to finalization of Findings and Conclusions and
preparation of Judgment
Total

3.00

600.00

398.60

$ 67,907.50

(R. 4335-4489, 4756-57, 4782-92, 4790-4810, 4949-50)
As shown by the summaries and the computer generated reports of time spent,
which were kept by counsel for Mr. Kraatz contemporaneously with the services
provided, counsel provided a total of 3,911.80 hours of service to Mr. Kraatz through
the March 26, 2001 hearing on damages, and attorneys fees and costs, although only
3,493.60 of these hours are included in Mr. Kraatzfs statement of attorney fees. The
average billing rates listed by counsel for Mr. Kraatz over the life of this case range
from between $90.00 and $169.00 per hour for attorneys, and between $45.00 and
$60.00 per hour for clerks and paraprofessionals. These hourly rates are well within
the range of reasonableness for this community. (R. 4784, 4796, 4951)
Heritage presented no evidence that the fees claimed in the affidavits of Mr.
Zundel (R. 5102-21, 4793-4810) and Mr. Linebaugh (R. 4782-92) and the supporting
Appendix (R. 4331-4606), as amended in plaintiff's reply memorandum on the issues
of damages and fees (R. 4744-47, 4749-50, 4756-57), were unreasonable. Further
Heritage did not move to strike or otherwise object to the admissibility of those
affidavits. In addition, Heritage did not offer any evidence at the March 26, 2001
evidentiary hearing, or object to the evidence Kraatz offered at this hearing (March 26,
2001 Tr., 5059, pp. 2-4). Heritage never argued that Kraatz's appeal fees were
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excessive. (R. 4635-41; March 26, 2001 Tr., R. 5059) Heritage also never offered
any specific objections to Kraatz's post-remand fees, but only generally argued that
they were excessive (March 26, 2001 Tr., R. 5059, pp. 19-20).
Thus, there was no evidence rebutting the evidence that Kraatz's fees were
reasonable, based upon the experience and expertise of the attorneys involved, the legal
work actually performed, the difficulty of the litigation, the time spent, the amount
involved and results obtained, the efficiency of the attorneys and staff involved, and
fees charged by reputable attorneys for comparable services in the Salt Lake area.
(R. 5110-11, 4784, 4796; March 26, 2001 Tr., R. 5059, p.4)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL
The amount of the fee award to Kraatz was not an abuse of discretion. As set
forth above, there was ample evidence in the record to support the amount of the
award. Heritage's opening brief failed to marshal that evidence. Also, Heritage failed
to offer any evidence in the district court attacking the reasonableness of the fees.
Kraatz's compensable and non-compensable claims were closely related and
involved a great deal of overlapping proof. Nevertheless, Kraatz did allocate his
attorney fees, and in his Reply Memorandum in the district court Kraatz reduced the
amount of his fee claim through trial, based on objections Heritage raised in its
Memorandum in Opposition.
No allocation was required as to appeal or post-appeal fees, all of which applied
to Kraatz's claim against Heritage for breach of the express terms of the Contract. In
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addition, Heritage made no specific objections in the district court to the amounts of the
appeal and post-appeal fees.
Heritage makes several arguments in its opening brief that Heritage did not make
in the district court. These arguments are raised for the first time on appeal, and
should not be considered by this Court.
Under Utah law the amount of Kraatz's damage award is not an upper limit on
his fee award. Also, the amount in controversy in the district court was far greater
than Kraatz's fee award, and if Kraatz prevails on the main appeal, he will receive an
award of damages, expenses, and pre-judgment interest far greater than his fee award.
Heritage cites no Utah law in support of his arguments that settlement
negotiations are in any way relevant to the amount of Kraatz's fee award. Also
Heritage's characterization of these negotiations is misleading, incomplete and not
supported by evidence in the record.
Thus, the trial court's fee award should be affirmed, and Kraatz should also be
awarded his costs, expenses and reasonable fees incurred on this appeal, in amounts to
be determined by the district court on remand.
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ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL
THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY FEES THE TRIAL COURT
AWARDED TO KRAATZ WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
A.

HERITAGE HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVDDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE AMOUNT OF THE FEE AWARD, WHICH
WAS UNREBUTTED

As discussed above, and as conceded in Heritage's opening brief, a party
contending that the trial court abused its discretion as to the amount of the attorney fee
award must first marshal all of the evidence in support of the amount, and then show
why that evidence is legally insufficient. Valcarce, supra. 961 P.2d at 317. The facts
supporting the amount of the fee award here are set forth in the Statement of Facts on
Cross-Appeal above.
Heritage's opening brief at pp. 11-13 devotes less than two pages to a purported
marshaling of the evidence. However, the only evidence Heritage references is the fee
reductions Kraatz made in response to Heritage's objections in its Memorandum in
Opposition.
Heritage ignores all of the other evidence supporting the fee award, discussed
above, including the duration, difficulty and complexity of the litigation (including the
first appeal, and the post-remand damage issues), the overlapping nature of the
compensable and noncompensable claims, Heritage's aggressive (to say the least)
defense of the case, the evolving nature of the amount in controversy, the necessary
financial analysis of Heritage, the reasons for the number of depositions taken, the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

'

experience and expertise of Kraatzfs counsel, the necessity of involving multiple
attorneys in Kraatz's representation, and the overall reasonableness of the fee award.
(R. 5107-5115, 5117-18, 4784, 4796; March 26, 2001 Tr., R. 5059, p.4) Thus, the
amount of the fee award must be upheld based on Heritage's failure to marshal the
evidence in support of that amount.
Although conceding that marshaling is required, and purporting to marshal
(albeit unsuccessfully), Heritage appears to suggest that the marshaling requirement is
somehow affected by the fact that no live testimony was taken, and by a false allegation
that no evidentiary hearing was held. However, the fact that testimony supporting the
fee award came in by affidavit, rather than live testimony, is irrelevant to the
marshaling requirement. Also, an evidentiary hearing on fees was held, at which
Heritage's counsel declined to examine Mr. Kraatz's attorneys regarding the fees
incurred.
Affidavits are the typical way of presenting evidence in support of the
reasonableness of attorney fees. See, Rule 4-505 of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Administration [with which the affidavits of Kraatz's counsel and the supporting
appendix complied (R. 4331-4606, 4782-4810, 5102-21)]. An unrebutted affidavit
provides an ample evidentiary basis for a fee award. Estate of Covington v. Josephson.
supra, 888 P.2d at 679.
Here, Heritage offered no affidavits or other evidence to controvert the
reasonableness of the amount of the fees Kraatz claimed, as proven by the affidavits of
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Kraatz's counsel and the supporting appendix. (R. 4331-4606, 4782-4810, 5102-21)
In its Memorandum in Opposition, Heritage objected to certain portions of the fee
request (through trial only) (R. 4635-41), and in its Reply Memorandum, Kraatz
reduced his fee request in response to some of those objections. (R. 4744-47, 4749-50,
4756-57) Heritage now argues that the amount of the fee reduction was insufficient.
However, Heritage presented no evidence in the trial court that the amount of the fees
Kraatz claimed, either before or after Kraatz's fee reductions, was unreasonable.
Heritage argues that the First Zundel Aff. contained inadmissible argument and
legal conclusions, citing (incompletely at p. 11 of its brief) Capital Assets Fin. Services
v. Lindsay. 956 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah, App. 1998), ajf'd., 2000 UT 9, 994 P.2d 201.
However, Heritage never objected in the district court to the affidavits of plaintiff Is
counsel, by a motion to strike or otherwise. Without a motion to strike, objections to
the admissibility of evidence in affidavits are waived. See, Salt Lake City Corp. v.
James Constructors. Inc.. 761 P.2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988).
In Capital Assets, unlike here, the party objecting to the affidavits filed a motion
to strike, thereby properly preserving its objections. 956 P.2d at 1092. Like several
other arguments discussed herein, Heritage improperly raises its objections to the
affidavits of Kraatz's counsel, for the first time on appeal. See, Hart, supra.
Because the affidavits of Kraatz's counsel were unrebutted, there was no need
for an evidentiary hearing (or detailed findings of fact). Estate of Covington v.
Josephson. supra. 888 P.2d at 679. Nevertheless, contrary to Heritage's contention,
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there was an evidentiary hearing in the district court on March 26, 2001, at which
Heritage chose not to present any evidence.
At the March 26, 2001 hearing, Kraatz offered ten exhibits into evidence,
without objection from Heritage. (R. 4811; March 26, 2001 Tr., R. 5059, pp. 2-4)
Kraatz's counsel also offered to take the stand, an offer that Heritage's counsel declined
to accept.3 (March 26, 2001 Tr. R. 5059, p. 4) Also, as indicated above, Heritage
never objected at any time in the district court to Kraatz's appeal fees, or made any
specific objections to his post-remand fees.
Thus, the amount of the trial court's fee award must be affirmed because the
evidence in support of the reasonableness of the amount was unrebutted by any contrary
evidence, and because Heritage has failed to marshal that evidence on appeal.
B.

KRAATZ PROPERLY ALLOCATED HIS ATTORNEY FEES

All of Kraatz's claims against Heritage and its co-defendants, the principals in
Heritage, arose from the same factual nexus, Heritage's wrongful termination of its
employment agreement with Kraatz, the reasons for that termination (whether for
3

At the beginning of the March 26, 2001 hearing, the trial court indicated it
would limit the presentations to twenty minutes per side. (March 26, 2001 Tr., R.
5059, p. 2) However, if Heritage felt it needed more time, such as to cross examine
Kraatz's counsel or to present testimony of its own as to the reasonableness of Kraatz's
fees (or fee reductions), Heritage should have objected to the trial court's limits on its
presentation and/or asked for a continuance. By failing to do so, Heritage again has
waived any objections to the adequacy of the March 26, 2001 hearing. See, Betts v.
Crawford, 965 P.2d 680, 685 (Wyo. 1998). Further, the only arguments Heritage
made as to attorney fees at this hearing were that the post-remand fees were excessive
(without pointing to any specifics), and that the court should take a "broad brush
approach to the issue of attorney's fees." (March 26, 2001 Tr., R. 5059, pp. 19-20).
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cause, within the meaning of the agreement, or for other reasons), and Kraatz's
resulting damages. (Complaint, R. 1-41) Indeed the damages Kraatz sought in each of
these claims (but one) were identical4 (except for punitive damages on the tort claims
against the individual defendants). (Id.) Thus, proof of the compensable claim, the
First Cause of Action against Heritage for breach of the express terms of the
employment agreement, necessarily overlapped with proof of the non-compensable
claims, eliminating the need to allocate attorney fees between the compensable and
non-compensable claims. Brown v. David K. Richards & Co.. supra. 1999 Utah
Ct. App. 109,120.
Nevertheless, counsel for Kraatz was able to allocate some fees as solely related
to non-compensable claims, and did not seek an award of those fees. For example, at
the time counsel filed the motion seeking fees, counsel excluded $15,691.50 in fees as
being non-assessable, most of which related to claims against the individual defendants.
(R. 5107-08, 4336) Later, in response to objections in Heritage's Memorandum in
Opposition (R. 4635-41), Kraatz's Reply Memorandum reduced his claim by an
additional $15,146.14, most of which also related to non-compensable claims. (R.
4744-47, 4749-50, 4756-57)
Heritage now argues that those fee reductions were insufficient. However,
Heritage never objected in the district court to the amount of the fee reductions

"Kraatz's measure of damages on his Second Cause of Action, against Heritage
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, was different. (IcL)
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(March 26, 2001 Tr., R. 5059), and therefore is precluded from doing so now, for the
first time on appeal. See, Hart, supra. Similarly, Heritage did not raise in the district
court the specific time entries that Heritage now argues contain references to noncompensable claims.5 [Compare Heritage's Memorandum in Opposition (R. 4635-41)
with pages 45-46 and Tab 4 of Heritage's opening brief]
That Kraatz did not reduce his claim of $130,557.75 in fees for Discovery and
Analysis Regarding Damages and Nullification of Heritage's "For Cause" Defenses,
merely reflects the overlapping facts underlying the compensable and non-compensable
claims. Also, Heritage again did not complain in the district court about this fee
component, and the trial court had the discretion to adopt the fee reductions Kraatz
proposed.6 See, Valcarce, supra, 961 P.2d at 317 (amount of fee award is
discretionary with trial court).
Heritage's argument that Kraatz should have allocated fees incurred on the first
appeal is without merit. That appeal was devoted exclusively to the compensable claim
that Heritage breached the express terms of the employment agreement (March 26,
2001 Ex. 5 through 9), a claim on which Kraatz prevailed.

5

Heritage also did not complain in the district court about alleged "lumping"
together compensable and non-compensable time entries. Also, as evidenced by the
reductions counsel made, counsel was able to segregate such entries.
6

Heritage does not explain why it contends that the allocation of fees for Direct
Trial Preparation and Trial Presentation, based on the number of trial transcript pages
for certain witnesses, was inappropriate, and again raises this argument for the first
time on appeal.
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Kraatz also was not required to allocate post-remand fees, because those fees
related exclusively to damages, attorney fees, costs and expenses awardable on the
compensable breach of contract claim. Heritage's argument that Kraatz is not entitled
to fees in pursuing "extra-contractual damages" is nonsense. This Court's precedent
regarding allocation of fees refers to allocation among liability claims and among
parties, not among elements of damages. In any event, all of the damages Kraatz
sought post-remand were breach of contract damages, either expressly provided for in
the employment contract, or consequential damages arising from breach of that
contract. See, Heslop v. Bank of Utah. 839 P.2d 828, 840-41 (Utah 1992)
(consequential damages available for breach of contract).
Similarly nonsensical is Kraatz's argument that this Court's decision on the, first
appeal [1999 Utah Ct. App. 70, Supplemental Appendix ("Aplt. Supp. Add.") A
hereto], somehow limited the scope of Kraatz's contractual damages on remand, and
that this is now the law of the case. As indicated elsewhere herein, the only issue
decided on the first appeal was whether the trial court erred in determining that
Heritage had "cause," within the meaning of the contract, to terminate Mr. Kraatz's
employment. Because of the trial court's erroneous finding that Heritage had cause to
terminate the contract, there was no damage award from which either party could have
appealed. Thus, neither Kraatz's briefs nor this Court's decision, on the first appeal,
addressed or could have properly addressed, the scope of Kraatz's damages once a
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breach was found (March 26, 2001 Ex. 5 through 9, Aplt. Supp. Add. A), and Kraatz
is entitled to all of his attorney fees incurred on his damage claims.
Accordingly, Kraatz properly allocated his attorney fees.
C.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER ARGUMENTS
HERITAGE RAISES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON THIS APPEAL

As indicated elsewhere herein, Heritage makes numerous arguments that it did
not make in the district court and that are raised for the first time on appeal. This
Court should not consider those arguments. See, Hart, supra.
Additional arguments that Heritage makes for the first time on appeal are that
Kraatz fs fee request should be reduced by the amount of time spent analyzing Judge
Frederick's reversal rate (prior to the first appeal), by (local) travel time and by time
allegedly spent by two or more attorneys on the same task. (R. 4635-41; March 26,
2001 Tr., R. 5059) Of the attorney conferences Heritage complains about on appeal,
only those occurring on November 6, November 10, November 18, December 10 and
December 16, 1992 were raised in the district court. (R. 4638, n. 12)
Moreover, the mere fact that trial courts have exercised their discretion to
reduce fees in the foregoing categories, does not mean that the trial court here abused
its discretion in allowing the fees Kraatz claimed in these categories. Heritage cites no
case in which a trial court was found to have abused its discretion in awarding fees
included in any of the above categories.7 Paragraphs 30, 31 and 34 of the First Zundel
7

One of the cases Heritage cites in support of reducing Kraatz's fee award is
U.S. v. Self, 818 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Utah 1992). Self is distinguishable because it
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Aff., which again is unrebutted, establish the reasonableness of involving more than
one attorney in this case. (R. 5113, 5115)
Thus, this Court should ignore Heritage's arguments that were not made in the
trial court.

D.

THE AMOUNT OF KRAATZS DAMAGE AWARD IS NOT A
CEILING FOR THE AMOUNT OF KRAATZS ATTORNEY FEE
AWARD

At pages 48-49 of its opening brief, Heritage states: "All authorities prompt the
conclusion that only under exceptional circumstances (not present here) should a
'reasonable' attorney fee exceed the principal amount recovered."8 That statement is
not supported by the cases upon which Heritage relies (none of which are from Utah),
and is directly contradicted by Utah law.
One of the cases that Heritage cites in support of the above statement is Diamond
D Enterprises USA. Inc. v. Steinsvaag. 979 F.2d 14 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert. den., 508

involves fees awarded under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A ("CJA").
Under the CJA, private attorneys are appointed to represent indigent defendants in
federal criminal cases. In Self the court noted that appointments under the CJA,'. . .
are neither to be sought nor made for the purpose of providing income to attorneys.
Indeed, acceptance of such an appointment is tantamount to acceptance of public
service.' (Id., at 1446, citation omitted)
8

Heritage also raises this issue for the first time on appeal. The trial court
determined the fee award at the same time it determined the damage award.
Nevertheless, Heritage argued to the trial court that Kraatz should be awarded only
$37,602.82 in damages (i.e., that Kraatz should be awarded nothing for stock
appreciation). (R. 4620, 4629-30, 4651) However, Heritage never argued in the trial
court that Kraatz's attorney fee award could not exceed this amount, or any other
amount the court might award. (R. 4635-41)
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U.S. 951 (1993). However, Diamond D makes it clear that under New York law it is
the amount in controversy not the amount of the damage recovery, that may limit an
attorney fee award. IdL at 19-20. Diamond D affirmed an award of attorney fees of
almost $41,000.00, where the damage award was $17,000.00.9
With respect to Utah law, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that, " . . .
although the amount in controversy can be a factor in determining a reasonable fee,
care should be used in putting much reliance on this factor." Dixie State Bank v.
Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988). In Cabrera, supra, the Court held (directly
contrary to the above quote from Heritage's brief): "The amount of the damages
awarded in a case does not place a necessary limit on the amount of attorneys fees that
can be awarded." 694 P.2d at 625. Cabrera affirmed an attorney fee award of
$19,000.00 where the damage award was $11,350.00. See also. Valcarce, supra,
affirming a fee award of $42,000.00 where the damage award was only $10,000.00.
Here, as indicated above, the original amount in controversy was over
$3,500,000.00 (R. 8). That amount was reduced over time as Kraatz mitigated his
damages through subsequent employment, and limited his damage claim to the initial
five year term of his contract. At the time of trial, his damage claim was $553,485.55
(after mitigation, and not including prejudgment interest, costs, expenses and attorney

9

In another case Heritage cites for a different proposition, the court awarded
$89,987.25 in fees to a plaintiff who accepted an offer of judgment for $50,000.00.
Webb v. James. 967 F. Supp. 320, 322, 324 (N.D. 111. 1997), qff'd., 147 F.3d 617 (7t]
Cir. 1998).
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fees) (R. 5112), and he had incurred only $225,210.36 of his total fee claim. (R.
5107-08, 4336, 4756-57, 4948) Moreover, if he prevails on the main appeal, Kraatz
will be entitled to damages far exceeding the fee award (to date).
Thus, the amount of Kraatz's damage award (to date) does not justify reducing
the amount of his fee award.
E.

SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS PROVIDE NO BASIS FOR
REDUCTION OF KRAATZ'S FEE AWARD

Heritage cites no Utah law in support of its argument that the trial court should
consider settlement negotiations in determining the amount of a fee award. The factors
Utah courts do consider are set forth in Cabrera, supra, as quoted on p. 47 of
Heritage's opening brief (i.e., difficulty of the litigation, efficiency of attorneys,
reasonableness of hours, fees customarily charged in the locality, amount involved,
result obtained and expertise and experience of attorneys). Settlement negotiations are
not among these factors, and Kraatz's evidence on the factors that are relevant was
unrebutted by any evidence from Heritage.
Even if settlement negotiations were relevant, Heritage's characterization of the
negotiations is misleading. The two settlement letters that Heritage cites (Appendix 1
and 2 of its opening brief) speak for themselves. Heritage's characterization of the
August 23, 1996 meeting referenced in the second letter is not supported by any
evidence in the record and is incomplete. Heritage fails to point out that it promised
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Kraatz that Bryan Wilkinson would be at the meeting, so meaningful negotiations could
be held, and that Wilkinson never showed up. (R. 4748)
At the time of Heritage's $308,000.00 offer (at the beginning of the case),
Kraatz's claim exceeded $3,500,000.00, because he had not yet been able to mitigate
his damages. At the time of Heritage's $325,000.00 offer (right before trial), Kraatz
had incurred almost $225,210.36 in attorney fees, some $80,000-90,000 in costs
(R. 4231, 4313), in addition to the $553,485.55 principal amount of his damage claim
at that time (after mitigation) (R. 5112), along with pre-judgment interest. It is also
misleading for Heritage to focus on only two settlement offers, where the undisputed
evidence is that, prior to trial, Kraatz's counsel spent over 70 hours trying to settle the
case. (R. 4336)
It is also undisputed that Heritage never made an offer of judgment under Utah
R. Civ. P. 68. Even if it had, failure to accept a Rule 68 offer greater than the ultimate
judgment does not stop the offeror's liability for attorney fees (as opposed to costs)
from continuing to accrue. See, Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601, 604 (Utah 1978).
Thus, settlement negotiations are not a proper basis for reducing Kraatz's fee
award.
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REPLY ARGUMENT ON MAIN APPEAL
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF FACT REGARDING THE
VALUE OF THE DEALERSHIP IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
In reviewing the challenged findings of a trial judge, this Court does not give the
same amount of deference it would give to factual determinations made by a jury. See.
Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1283 n. 2 (Utah 1993). In other words,
"an appellate court does not, as a matter of course, resolve all conflicts in the evidence
in favor of the appellee." IcL Nonetheless, Kraatz acknowledges that in order to
overturn the findings of fact made following a bench trial, he must still demonstrate
that the trial court's findings are "clearly erroneous." Saunders v. Sharp. 793 P.2d
927, 931 (Utah App. 1990), remanded on other grounds, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991).
In Utah, findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are without adequate evidentiary
foundation, if they are induced by an erroneous view of the law, or if there is no
evidence in the record to support a particular finding. Interiors Contracting. Inc. v.
Smith. Halander & Smith Assocs.. 881 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah App. 1994); Larson v.
Larson. 888 P.2d 719, 725 (Utah App. 1994).
With respect to the valuation of 100% of Heritage's stock, Heritage has not
shown any deficiency in Kraatz's marshaling of the evidence. Rather, Heritage argues
that despite the actual evidence, the trial court's findings should be sustained based
upon impermissibly remote evidence of the value of the dealership's stock (referring to
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the Contract's "initial value"), inaccurate recitals of what the witnesses actually said at
trial (demonstrated below) and flawed legal arguments (discussed below).
As a matter of law, the stock's "initial value" of $2,500,000.00 agreed to in
Kraatz's Contract is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of the fair
market value of the stock 27 months later, under Glezos v. Frontier Investment, 896
P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Heritage's brief provides no meaningful basis to
distinguish this precedent. The "initial value" of $2,500,000.00 is no evidence at all
that the stock was worth $3,100,000.00 27 months later as found by the trial court.
Alternatively, the evidentiary value of the dealership's "initial value" is without
legitimate persuasive force in light of the overwhelming weight of other unreftited
evidence [such as (1) Larry Miller's actual purchase price of $3,000,000.00 to
$3,100,000.00 for 60% of the stock, (2) his contemporaneous offer to buy the other
40% for $1,200,000.00 in December 1992, and (3) his unrecanted admission that the
stock was worth approximately $200,000.00 more in September of the same year]. The
contract's "initial value" provides "no evidence" to support the Court's implicit finding
that the 40% of the stock remaining, after Mr. Miller's purchase of the other 60%, had
no value. Neither of the witnesses who testified concerning the value (Mr. Miller and
Dr. Schmitz) relied on the contractual "initial value" in forming their opinions of value.
With respect to Heritage's historic losses, these losses were considered by both
Mr. Miller and Mr. Schmitz, and both men considered them not to be predictive of
Heritage's future economic performance, and made adjustments accordingly. (Ex. 329,
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Tabs 2 and 3; R. 2237, 2556-60, 2071) The issue of whether the dealership's net book
value had decreased between January 1990 and December 1992, by 50% or something

(

less, is completely subsumed by the undisputed fact that the adjusted book value of
Heritage, as of December 1992, was approximately $1,100,000.00 (R. 2217-18). In
the opinion of both side's valuation witnesses, the "book value" of the dealership was a
smaller part of the overall valuation than was the value of the dealership's future
expected profits or "blue sky." (R. 2225-26.) Thus, Heritage's historic losses are "no
evidence" that the 40% of the stock remaining, after Larry Miller's acquisition of the
other 60%, had no value.
In its brief, Heritage does not cite to any evidence relevant to valuation of
Heritage's stock that was not marshaled by Kraatz in his opening brief. Howeverr
Heritage does, repeatedly, misrepresent what the evidence actually was regarding this
issue.
«

At trial, Larry Miller did not "explain" away his deposition testimony
concerning his opinions of the value of 100% of Heritage's stock as of September 1992
and as of December 1992. At most, Mr. Miller merely weakly recanted his prior
admissions without relevant explanation as to why the prior admissions should not bind
him and his company, Heritage.
Mr. Miller's testimony on this issue at trial was previously quoted in Appellant's
opening brief at pages 27-29. He did not assert that the remaining 40% of the stock
was worthless because of a "minority discount" as represented at p. 10 of Defendant's
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Brief, citing pages 2216 through 2222 of the Record. Mr. Miller did not ever refer to a
"minority discount" in his testimony, much less a discount so great as to render the
remaining 40% of Heritage's stock worthless. Rather, he failed to answer his counsel's
leading question regarding this subject as demonstrated by the following excerpt from
the Record (previously quoted in Appellant's opening brief at p. 28):
MR. WINDER: And why-if you bought, Mr. Miller, if you bought 60%
of the stock for $3 million to $3,100,000—why does that equate to the
value of the dealership? Or how does it equate to the value of the
dealership?
MR. MILLER: Well, if the corporation pays 100% of the obligations
reflected in the formula that we've gone through earlier, then I pick up
60% of that and I think that clearly establishes in real numbers, not any
theory, but in real numbers what was paid in the transaction.
MR. WINDER: So you paid 60% or you paid $360,000.00 for 60% of
the stock?
MR. MILLER: Correct.
MR. WINDER: And every other amount that you paid to Mr. Wilkinson
was paid by the company from 100% of the stock?
MR. MILLER: That's correct.
(R. 2217)
Mr. Miller's explanation that he personally paid $360,000.00, but had his
newly-acquired company, Heritage, pay the remainder of the total purchase price of $3
million to $3.1 million for 60% of the stock, has nothing to do with the value of the
remaining 40%. Mr. Miller's answer does not refer to the remaining 40%. That Mr.
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Miller structured his stock purchase as a leveraged buyout of 60% of the stock is not
evidence that the remaining 40% was worthless.
Mr. Miller did not ever testify that the remaining 40% of the stock was "not a
significant factor," as misrepresented at p. 19 of Defendant's Brief, citing pages 2201

i

through 2202 of the Record. Rather, Mr. Miller testified at those pages that he offered
to pay $1,200,000.00 to the 40% minority shareholders for their stock. He admitted
i

that had his offer been accepted by the minority shareholders he, in fact, was willing to
pay $4,200,000.00 for 100% of the stock as of December 1992, and that the stock was
$194,000.00 more valuable in September 1992, when Mr. Kraatz's employment was
terminated. (R. 2201-02.)
Mr. Miller never testified that the remainder of Mr. Miller's purchase price over
$360,000.00 was allocated to such things as a noncompete agreement and a deferred
compensation agreement with Bryan Wilkinson, as misrepresented at p. 19 of
Defendant's Brief (referring to pages 4073-76 of the Record and exhibits 86 and 88).
Rather, at trial Mr. Miller candidly admitted that all of the $3,000,000.00 to
$3,100,000.00 paid to Bryan Wilkinson was properly attributable to the value of the
60% of Heritage's stock he purchased, irrespective of how the purchase price was
broken up in the purchase documents:
MR. ZUNDEL: All right. Now, you had various forms of this
compensation to ~ Mr. Wilkinson took various forms, a non-compete
agreement, a deferred compensation agreement, a stock purchase
agreement, and some benefit that he got under the management agreement
that was signed in December of 1992, right?
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MR. MILLER: Yes, that's correct.
MR. ZUNDEL: All right, and there wasn't - there isn't any separate
value to Bry's agreement not to compete, is there?
MR. MILLER: Real value in it, you mean?
MR. ZUNDEL: Right, real value. It's all part of the good will of the
corporation?
MR. MILLER: I would say that's basically correct.
MR. ZUNDEL: All right, so we don't have to worry about splitting them
up. We can just deal with all of them as a fair market value of the
corporation, right?
MR. MILLER: I agree with that.
(R. 2187-88) Defendant's attempt to raise this smokescreen is not proper because the
issue was conceded at trial. (Id.) The Court's findings also do not adopt this suggested
allocation of the purchase price.
Mr. Miller never testified that 100% of Heritage's stock "was not worth $4.2
million in September of 1992," as misrepresented at p. 20 of Defendant's Brief
(referring to pages 2200 through 2202 of the Record). Rather, at the referenced pages,
Mr. Miller temporarily refused to readmit (as he had admitted in deposition) that as of
September 1992, 100% of Heritage's stock was worth $4,400,000.00, but then
admitted that Bryan Wilkinson and his family "would have gotten" (R. 2202)
$4,200,000.00 if the 40% minority shareholders had sold their stock at the same time
as the majority 60% interest was sold in December 1992. Mr. Miller's immediately
following vague statement that "[i]f you talk about the value of the stock, I still say it
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
-32-may contain errors.

comes back to $3 million" (R. 2202) can only be reconciled with his contemporaneous
testimony as a reference to the 60% of the stock he purchased, and a refusal to address

(

the value of the remaining 40%. Thus, there is simply no evidentiary basis for the
Court's implicit finding that the 40% of the stock Mr. Miller did not buy had no value

i

at all.
Despite Mr. Miller's protestations, it is not "mixing apples and oranges"
i

(R. 2201) to add to Miller's actual purchase price for 60% of the stock, what Miller
undisputedly simultaneously offered to pay for the remaining 40%, in order to
determine the minimum value of 100% of the stock as of December 1992. Miller's
claim that Kraatz's counsel was trying to "cut, paste and glue this deal and try and
come up with the biggest number," (R. 2209) was not in reference to the calculation
referred to in the preceding sentence, but rather was in reference to Kraatz's counsel's
questions regarding prior offers made by Miller for the Heritage stock that, had they
been accepted, establish an even higher value than the $4.4 million urged by Kraatz's
expert, Dr. Schmitz (R. 2209, 2237).
The fact that Heritage was at one time audited by the IRS has nothing to do with
the valuation of Heritage's stock at the time Kraatz was fired. It is also wholly
irrelevant to the valuation issue that American Honda never objected to Heritage's
accounting methods. American Honda was never asked to render an opinion of the
value of 100% of Heritage's stock. American Honda's apparent (due to silence)
satisfaction with the accuracy of the accounting records for its own purposes was not,
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and could not have been, relied on by the Court or any of the experts as an indication
of the value of the stock. Both Mr. Miller (R. 2071, 2084-85) and Dr. Schmitz
(R. 2238, 2318-19) reviewed and made adjustments to Heritage's historic books and
records for the purpose of projecting future income and valuing the stock.
The evidence Heritage accurately refers to in its opening brief is irrelevant
evidence on the issue of valuation, and does not support the Court's implied finding
that the remaining 40% of Heritage's stock had no value. Thus, by marshaling the
evidence, Kraatz has demonstrated the trial court's finding that the value of 100% of
the stock of Heritage was $3.1 million, based on Mr. Miller's purchase of 60% of the
stock for that amount, is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence and thus clearly erroneous.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
REFUSING TO AWARD KRAATZ CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
ARISING FROM HERITAGES BREACH OF THE EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACT
Mr. Kraatz's opening brief disposes of most of the factual and legal arguments
Heritage makes in contending that Kraatz is not entitled to consequential damages
(which Heritage mischaracterizes as "extra-contractual damages") for Heritage's breach
of the employment contract. While Mr. Kraatz will not unnecessarily repeat the points
he made in his opening brief as to the trial court's legal errors in refusing to award
consequential damages (such as lost contributions to Kraatz's mandatory retirement
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plan, Christmas bonuses, income from the sale of warranty contracts and the like),
certain arguments Heritage makes in its opening brief on this issue require further
response.
Heritage misstates the applicable standard of review. The issue is not the
adequacy of the damage award, i.e., the amount of the award, because the trial court
awarded Kraatz nothing for consequential damages. The issue is whether the trial court
applied the wrong measure of damages, i.e.,. excluded an entire category of damages
(consequential damages) to which Mr. Kraatz is entitled. The issue of the correct
measure of damages is a legal issue subject to de novo review on appeal. Lysenko v.
Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, 11 15-17, 7 P.3d 783.
By repetitive use of the phrase "extra-contractual damages," Heritage apparently
hopes to convince this Court, by subliminal suggestion, that Kraatz's claim for
"consequential damages" for breach of contract is something new and unprecedented.
Heritage does not, however, directly attack the precedent Kraatz relies upon for his
claim to consequential damages arising from the wrongful termination of his
employment, i.e., Heslop, supra, 839 P.2d at 840-41.
Rather, Heritage suggests (and the trial court agreed), without any citation to
authority, that a form of the parol evidence rule should apply to exclude evidence of
Kraatz's consequential damages because "if extrinsic evidence cannot be used to
determine whether there was cause for termination . . . " (Page 23 of Heritage's
opening brief) it should not be allowed to show the full extent of Kraatz's damages.
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This argument has no merit for a number of reasons, chief among them being that the
parol evidence rule does not apply to subsequent (as opposed to prior and
contemporaneous) statements and other evidence regarding the terms of a contract.
Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). In addition,
proof of consequential damages, as opposed to benefit of bargain damages, almost
always involves "extrinsic evidence." Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange. 701 P.2d 795,
801 (Utah 1985). Nothing in this Court's ruling in the prior appeal suggests otherwise.
This Court's Memorandum Decision filed March 11, 1999 (Aplt. Supp. Add. A)
is devoted exclusively to considering whether evidence was properly adduced at trial
sufficient to justify the trial court's ruling that Kraatz was fired for "cause." After a
careful review of the entire record this Court wrote, at p. 4:
Our review of the record reveals no evidentiary basis
for terminating Kraatz for cause. We therefore reverse and
remand for a determination of Kraatz fs damages under the
contract, including reasonable attorney fees.
To suggest, as Heritage does, that this language was intended by this Court to
limit the amount of Kraatz's damage recovery is simply without basis. There was no
discussion in this Court's opinion of limiting Kraatz's damages on remand, and no
rationale has been articulated by Heritage to justify such an odd result. Such a
limitation would be contrary to the pronouncement of the Utah Supreme Court in
Heslop that a wrongfully terminated employee is entitled to a broad range of general
and consequential damages. Heslop. 839 P.2d at 840-41.
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Kraatz has not raised in this appeal any issue that was not presented to and
decided by the trial court on remand, regarding the type and amount of damages to
which Kraatz is entitled. Heritage's suggestion that somehow these damage issues
addressed on remand by the express command of this Court cannot now be reviewed in
this appeal is specious.
Similarly, Heritage's reliance on selected paragraphs in the trial court's original
findings in support of its reversed judgment dismissing Kraatz's claims is not proper.
It is well settled, and only logical, that "the doctrine of the law of the case cannot be
applied ...to factual questions which were expressly remanded for determination by the
trial court." 5 Am. Jur. 2d § 610. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of
Phebus v. Dunford. 198 P.2d 973, 974 (Utah 1948), "[o]ur decision was without,
limitation as to how much of the lower court's decision was set aside. It set it all
aside."
So too, this Court's Memorandum Decision was without limitation as to what
portions of the trial court's original Findings and Conclusions were set aside. While
the trial court was certainly free after remand to make whatever findings and
conclusions were appropriate based on the evidence and the law, it was not bound by
the prior reversed findings. Neither is this Court, nor Kraatz on this appeal, so bound
in assessing whether the trial court properly decided the damage issues remanded after
the first appeal. As indicated above, the errors that the trial court made in refusing to
award consequential damages were legal ones, involving 'rules or principles uniformly
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applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar circumstances.' Lynsenko,
supra, 2000 UT 58, f 17. These legal errors included injecting the concept of
consideration into a consequential damage analysis, and ignoring Mr. Kraatz's
undisputed compensation history establishing that his claims for consequential damages
were not speculative. See, Boothby v. Texon. Inc., 414 Mass. 468, 609 N.E. 2d 1028
(1993).
The reliance of Heritage and the trial court (R. 5016) on Namad v. Salomon.
Inc.. 147 A.D. 2d 385 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), qff'd., 543 N.E.2d 722 (1989), as to
so-called "discretionary" compensation is also misplaced. In Namad the employee had
never received the discretionary compensation he sought as damages. Here, of course,
Kraatz did receive the allegedly discretionary compensation during his employment, as
did his successor thereafter, so there is no reason to believe this compensation would
not have continued, but for Heritage's wrongful termination of Kraatz.
With respect to the foreseeability of Kraatz's consequential damages, the trial
court's errors were also legal ones. The trial court did not attempt to weigh the
evidence as to foreseeability, which was undisputed, and thus made no findings of fact
on the issue. Instead, the trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that foreseeability
was not established, for four erroneous legal reasons (R. 5017):
(1)

That the compensation enhancements were discretionary.

However, as discussed above, this is irrelevant in light of the undisputed facts
that Kraatz actually received those enhancements, as did his successor.
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(2)

That Heritage had no obligation to provide these enhancements

under the four corners of the agreement. The trial court erred as a matter of law
in using the parol evidence rule as a basis for refusing to consider evidence
supporting an award of consequential damages.
(3)

(

That the damages had to be foreseeable at the time the contract was

consummated. However, as argued in Kraatz's opening brief, the compensation
enhancements became foreseeable at the time they were added to the contract.
Also paragraph 3.2 of the original contract (Aplt. Add. C) expressly
contemplated the payment of "additional compensation."
(4)

That the damages were speculative. However, as discussed above,

Kraatz's undisputed compensation history is sufficient evidence of the

',•"••

consequential damages claimed, in order to make a finding of "speculative"
legally unsupportable. A damage claim is only speculative if there is no
evidence to support it.
With respect to some of Heritage's factual assertions on consequential damages
in its opening brief, Kraatz asserts numerous times in his opening brief that the
testimony of his expert accountant Bruce Wisan was not challenged as far as his
calculations, methodology or, on numerous occasions, his conclusions, with respect to
the value of various items of benefits and the so-called "extra-contractual"
compensation. At page 7 of its opening brief, Heritage asserts that Wisan's
calculations were challenged by "extensive cross examination" (citing Wisan's
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testimony at R. 2125-40, Aplt. Supp. Add. B hereto). However, Kraatz stands by his
assertion with respect to the particular items of damages stated, in detail, in his opening
brief.
An examination of the above pages of the record reveals only that during Mr.
Wisanfs cross-examination he merely repeated his assumptions, methodology and
calculations. No admissions or concessions were obtained and no other evidence was
adduced to rebut Mr. Wisan on the issues addressed in Kraatzfs opening brief.
Heritage asks this Court to assume that the cross-examination somehow compromised
Mr. Wisan, which simply did not occur. Cross-examination alone, without gaining any
concession or exposing any articulable weakness of assumption or methodology, is
hardly impeaching, but rather is often bolstering of an adverse expert witness1
testimony, as is the case here. The point is, Heritage has not shown any instance when
Mr. Wisan!s testimony was impeached or even challenged by cross-examination or
another expert.
Heritage also misrepresents in its brief at page 7 that Mr. Wisan's testimony was
"challenged" by "Heritage's two accountants," citing pages 2177-80, 2400-04 &
Exhibit 333 of the record. However, again, if the cited pages are examined, one will
see that Mr. Wisan is not challenged at all by the testimony of the accountants. Indeed,
pages 2177-80 (Aplt. Supp. Add. C hereto) are the testimony of Mr. Christian
(Heritage's accountant) being questioned by Mr. Winder (Heritage's attorney) on crossexamination, after Mr. Christian was called by Mr. Kraatz to testify about Bryan
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Wilkinson's excessive spending and doctoring of Heritage's books to hide such
spending. Mr. Wisan's testimony is not even mentioned in the entire examination, and
the examination has nothing to do with Mr. Wisan's calculation of Mr. Kraatz's lost
compensation and benefits.

(

Similar, but more amusing, is the testimony at pages 2400-04 of Mr. Jensen (the
other Heritage accountant) (Aplt. Supp. Add. D hereto). He was called back to the
stand by Mr. Winder to confess that he had made an error in one of his calculations
regarding the performance of the dealership (in support of Heritage's failed attempt to
show that Kraatz was properly fired for lack of profitability of the operations~not in
support of any damage issue) and to say that he had corrected the error. Mr. Jensen
was then re-crossed by Mr. Zundel (Kraatz's attorney) who elicited the confession that
the calculation was still wrong and of no relevance (R. 2403). Again, Mr. Wisan's
testimony was not even mentioned or at issue during any of the examination cited.
Thus, the facts and expert opinions establishing the foreseeability and amounts of
Mr. Kraatz's consequential damages are undisputed in the record. The errors the trial
court made in refusing to award any consequential damages were legal ones, requiring
reversal with directions to award on remand consequential damages in the amounts
already proven by Kraatz.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
APPLYING RULE 54(d) STANDARDS TO EXPERT WITNESS
AND DEPOSITION EXPENSES AWARDABLE BY CONTRACT
Heritage fails to address the argument in Kraatz's opening brief (at pp. 43-44)
that the reason the trial court erred in refusing to award expenses for experts who did
not testify at trial, and for depositions of deponents who did not testify at trial, is
because the court applied Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d) standards to expenses awardable by
contract. Similarly, Heritage totally ignores the controlling authority of this Court's
holding in Chase v. Scott, 2001 Ut. Ct. App. 404, 1 20, 437 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, that
expenses awarded by contract "should not be limited by case law interpreting
Rule 54(d)."
That the trial court here erroneously applied Rule 54(d) standards is evidenced
by its Conclusions of Law, in which it cited Board of Commissioners of the Utah State
Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263, 1272 (Utah 1997); Sinclair v. Ins. Co. of North
America, 609 F. Supp. 397, 409 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1029, 1031 (3d Cir.
1986); and Ellis v. University of Kansas Medical Center, 2000 W L 1310508 (D. Kan.
Aug. 31, 2000) in support of denying the above costs (R. 5018-19). Petersen applied
Rule 54(d) standards in refusing to award certain deposition costs. In denying expert
witness fees, Sinclair appears to have applied cost standards under federal statute,
which similarly would not apply to costs awardable by contract. See, North Drive-in
Theatre Corp. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 248 F.2d 232, 238-239 (10th Cir. 1957). EUis
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also applies to costs under federal statute, not by contract.10 Heritage repeats the trial
court's error by relying on these same cases.
Heritage's interpretation of the contract is also erroneous. As to costs, the
contract states:
5.6 COST OF DEFAULT. In addition to any other
rights contained herein, in the event either party defaults in
the performance of any term or condition hereunder, the
defaulting party shall pay all expenses and costs incurred by
the other party in enforcing the terms hereof, including but
not limited to, costs, reasonable attorney's fees, expert
witness fees, and/or deposition costs whether incurred
through legal action or otherwise and whether incurred
before or after judgment.
(Aplt. Add. C, R. 4065, emphasis added) The expansive nature of the obligation to
pay "all costs and expenses incurred . . . including but not limited to . . ." defeatsHeritage's argument that the word "reasonable" was intended to modify not only
"attorney's fees," but also "expert witness fees" and "deposition costs."
Heritage's argument at page 28 of its opening brief that "reasonable" was
intended to modify all these categories of costs and expenses because, " . . . in this
case, 'reasonable' precedes 'expert witness fees' [and] is set off bv commas . . . "
(emphasis added) is just wrong. "Reasonable" is not set off by commas, and the
sentence at issue is not structured in a fashion that would lead one to believe that
"reasonable" was intended to modify anything other than "attorney's fees."
10

After discussing Elhs on page 32 of its opening brief, Heritage launches into a
diatribe about Kraatz's photocopy costs, ignoring the fact that neither Kraatz nor
Heritage is appealing from the amount of the copy cost award.
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Moreover, even assuming a reasonableness standard applies, it is contrary to the
contractual language to tie that standard to whether the expert witness or deponent
testified at trial. The contract imposes liability for costs and expenses, "whether
incurred through legal action or otherwise." Thus, for example, Kraatz could have
retained an expert for purposes of assessing his contract damage claim before ever
filing suit, and Heritage would be liable for the costs of retaining that expert.11
In arguing that Kraatz should not be awarded costs of depositions needed to
establish its claim for damages based on loss of warranty income, Heritage repeats its
same baseless argument that these damages are "extra-contractual" and not part of
Kraatz's contract claim. As discussed above, these damages are consequential damages
for breach of contract under Heslog, supra.
Thus, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in denying expenses for
non-testifying experts, and for depositions of non-testifying deponents. Application of
the correct standard requires an award to Kraatz of an additional $12,684.17 in expert
witness fees, and an additional $9,369.90 in deposition costs and witness fees.

"Sinclair, supra, is also distinguishable from the present case in that in Sinclair,
the experts provided absolutely no benefit to the plaintiff's case, whereas here, the
unrebutted First Zundel Aff. establishes both the necessity of the assistance provided by
the non-testifying experts on damage issues (R. 5106), as well as the necessity of the
depositions of the non-testifying deponents (R. 5117-18).
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POINT IV
KRAATZ IS ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST,
EITHER BECAUSE THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNTS OF ALL OF HIS
DAMAGES WERE CALCULABLE WITH THE REQUISITE
CERTAINTY, OR AS ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES FOR THE LOSS OF THE USE OF THESE AMOUNTS
OVER TIME
Kraatz's opening brief presented two arguments as to why it should have been
awarded pre-judgment interest on the principal amounts as to which the trial court
refused to award pre-judgment interest. First, each of these amounts was calculable
with the required degree of certainly. Second, to the extent certain amounts could not
be so calculated, Kraatz should be awarded pre-judgment interest as another form of
consequential damages, based on the loss of the use of these amounts over time.
Heslop. 839 P.2d at 840-41 (wrongfully terminated employee entitled to broad range of
consequential damages). Under the second argument, Heritage is not being penalized if
it cannot calculate the amount it owed Kraatz, because it has had the benefit of the use
of the money during the pendency of Kraatz's claim.
A.

CALCULABLE WITH THE REQUISITE CERTAINTY

With regard to the first argument, and as argued in Kraatz's opening brief (and
not rebutted by Heritage), there was no dispute at trial over how to calculate Kraatz's
damages based on the loss of the Sports Mall membership, Christmas bonuses, Jazz
tickets, retirement contributions, St. George home mortgage reimbursements and
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income from warranty service contracts. While Heritage may dispute liability, it has
not disputed the amounts.12
As to Kraatz's loss of the right to a 10% share of annual profits over
$280,000.00, the only dispute is over whether to make the accounting adjustments
Kraatz seeks. Once the appropriateness of the adjustments is determined, the profit
calculation is undisputed. See, Jack B. Parson Constr. Co. v. State of Utah, 552 P.2d
107, 109 (Utah 1976) (pre-judgment interest awarded where principal amount due
under contract was ascertainable by calculation, and only the method of calculation was
uncertain).
As to valuation of the dealership at the time of Kraatz's wrongful termination,
for purposes of awarding his 15% share of the increase from his date of employment,
that valuation is established by Larry Miller's own testimony, above, that in December
1992 he purchased 60% of the dealership for $3 million, and offered to purchase the
other 40% for $1.2 million, for a total of $4.2 million.13 Thus, Heritage cannot dispute
that this amount was fixed and known to Heritage in December 1992.
As to expert witness expenses, these amounts were also fixed and known at the
time Kraatz "incurred" them [i.e., became liable for them, See, Webster's New
12

Similarly, as to the country club membership, while Heritage now disputes the
basis for Mr. Wisan's damage calculation, it did not do so at trial.
13

Again, Kraatz does not waive his claim to the additional $200,000.00 in value
at the time of his wrongful termination in September 1992. The $4.2 million is used
only as the liquidated value of the dealership for purposes of awarding prejudgment
interest beginning in December 1992.
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Collegiate Dictionary (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1977)]. Under Section 5.6 of the
contract, Heritage is liable for expert witness fees "incurred" by Kraatz. Thus, it does
not matter what arrangements Kraatz had with his experts regarding interest on their
charges. Heritage became liable to Kraatz (not the experts) for expert charges at the
times Kraatz incurred them (not when he paid them). Because Heritage did not pay
Kraatz, it is liable for interest on the amounts it owed Kraatz (not the experts),14 from
the time Heritage's payments were due, i.e., at the time Kraatz incurred these costs.
Also, Heritage does not contend that the amounts charged by the experts (even
the non-testifying experts) were unreasonable. Heritage only disputes its liability for
the charges of the non-testifying experts.
Kraatz withdraws his claim to pre-judgment interest on his attorney fees, other
than the $10,000.00 he was required to pay under paragraph 3 of the October 23, 1992
fee agreement (March 26, 2001 Ex. 2, Aple. App. 3), because the balance of the fee is
contingent.
However, Kraatz is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the $10,000.00 from
October 23, 1992, the date this fee obligation was incurred. See, First Security Bank

14

Unlike other litigation expenses, Kraatz, not his lawyers, was responsible for
payment of expert charges under paragraph 5 of his October 23, 1992 fee agreement
with his lawyers [March 26, 2001 Ex. 2, Appendix ("Aple. App.") 3 to Heritage's
opening brief]. However, Kraatz withdraws his claim to pre-judgment interest on other
litigation costs and expenses, because under the provisions of the fee agreement quoted
in Heritage's opening brief, the liability Kraatz "incurred" to repay his attorneys for
these other costs and expenses is contingent until there has been a recovery against
Heritage.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-47-

of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedvards. Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 600 (Utah 1982). Any policy that one
panel of the Utah Court of Appeals should not overrule another panel is overcome by
the Court's duty to follow Utah Supreme Court decisions. See, State v. Menzies. 889
P.2d 393, 399, n. 3 (Utah 1994), cert, den., 513 U.S. 1115 (1995). While the panel in
James Constructors. Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 888 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 1994),
may not have agreed with J.B.J. Feedvards. or felt it was poorly reasoned, the panel
was obligated to follow that decision, and it was clearly erroneous for the panel not to
do so. See, State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d at 393, n.3 (lower courts are required to follow
even 'judicial dicta' of higher courts). Moreover, even absent J.B.J. Feedvards.
Heritage does not and could not contend that the $10,000.00 portion of Kraatz's
attorney fee was unreasonable.
B.

AWARDABLE AS ADDITIONAL CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES

Heritage barely addresses Kraatz's second argument, that it does not matter
whether the principal damage amounts are readily calculable, because loss of the use of
those amounts is simply another form of consequential damages. While Heritage
briefly addresses Funkhouser v. J.B. Preston Company. Inc.. 290 U.S. 163, 168-169
(1933), and Restatement (Second) of Contracts. § 354(2), it ignores the line of cases
from several jurisdictions (discussed at pages 53-54 of Kraatz's opening brief),
indicating that, for purposes of a consequential damage analysis, it does not matter
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whether the principal amount is readily calculable, because the defendant has had the
use of that amount, and plaintiff has not, during the pendency of the litigation.15
Heritage also ignores the Utah Supreme Court decisions in Farnworth v. Jensen,
217 P. 2d 571 (Utah 1950), holding that pre-judgment interest is part of plaintiffs
damages in a breach of contract case, and Ong Int'l. (U.S.A.) v. 11th Ave. Corp. 850
P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993), affirming an award of the reasonable rate of return on
restitutionary damages. The broad range of consequential damages referred to in
Heslop ought to, in light of Farnworth and Ong, include pre-judgment interest on
damages determined at trial, even if these damages are not calculable with certainty
prior to trial.
Thus, Kraatz is entitled to pre-judgment interest on all of his damage claims, on
his expert witness costs, and on the non-contingent $10,000.00 in attorney fees he has
incurred.

15

Under this analysis, the cause of any delay in the litigation is irrelevant,
because defendant has had the benefit of the money during such delay (as well as after
the rejection of any settlement offers). Also, Heritage's argument about delay after the
first appeal is misleading, since it does not take into account Heritage's petition for
certiorari, or the parties' post-appeal settlement negotiations.
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POINT V
THE INCREASE IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX IS MERELY
AN ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF KRAATZ'S
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE LOSS
OF THE USE OF THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF HIS DAMAGE
AWARD OVER TIME
Heritage argues that there is only one case, from another jurisdiction, allowing
an increase in a damage award based on the increase in the Consumer Price Index over
time. This argument is irrelevant.
Heritage does not and cannot dispute that Kraatz has been damaged by the loss
of the use of the principal amount of his damage award over time, that such loss was
foreseeable, or that Heritage has benefitted by being able to use Kraatz's money during
the pendency of this litigation. Statutory pre-judgment interest is one way of measuring
the value of this loss. The increase in the CPI is merely an alternative measure of this
item of consequential damages.
As noted above, the Utah Supreme Court has approved alternative ways of
measuring the value of the loss of the principal amount of a damage award over time.
In Ong Int'l. (U.S.A.), supra, the prevailing party put on evidence of the reasonable
rate of return that could have been expected if that party had been able to invest its
restitutionary damage award. The Court affirmed an additional award based on this
evidence.
Here, Kraatz put on evidence of the increase in the CPI during the pendency of
this litigation (R. 4605-06, 5105), and that evidence was undisputed. To the extent preDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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i

judgment interest is not awarded here, this alternative measure of Kraatz's
consequential damage from the loss of the use of his principal damage award over time
is entirely appropriate under Ong Int'l. (U.S.A.).
CONCLUSION AND REQUESTED RELIEF
The amount of the attorney fee award to Mr. Kraatz should be affirmed. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that amount, which was supported
by substantial, unrebutted evidence in the record, which Heritage failed to marshal.
Mr. Kraatz should also be awarded his costs, expenses and reasonable attorney fees
incurred on this appeal, in amounts to be determined by the trial court on remand.
For the reasons argued in this brief and in Mr. Kraatzfs opening brief, the other
damage issues should be remanded to the trial court, with instructions to increase the
award by the amounts set forth in the conclusion to Mr. Kraatz's opening brief. In
addition, the trial court should be instructed to award pre-judgment interest on all of the
damage amounts (including the non-contingent $10,000.00 in attorney fees, and the
non-contingent expert witness fees, "incurred" by Mr. Kraatz, but excluding contingent
attorney fees and litigation expenses "incurred" by Mr. Kraatz).
As an alternative to pre-judgment interest, Mr. Kraatz's damage award should be
increased by the 20.09% increase in the Consumer Price Index-Urban. This adjustment
should be applied to all damages, including the $10,000.00 in attorney fees, and the
expert witness fees.
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Donald J- Winder and Jennifer L, Falk, Salt Lake
City, for Appellees

Before Judges Bench, Biljtifigs, and Davis.
BENCH, Judge:
When interpreting a contract, the court first determines, as
a matter of law,» whether the contract is ambiguous. Set*
Interwest Constr, v. Palmer. 923 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Utah 1996).
" 'A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than
one reasonable interpretation because- of "uncertain meanings of
terms, missing terms, or other*'facial deficiencies." 1 " Id. at
1359 (quoting Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P-2d 104, 108 (Utah
1991) (quoting Faulkner v. Famsworth. 66S P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah
1983))). The court may consider extrinsic evidence only if the
contract is ambiguous. See id.
Here, the trial court determined that the contract was
" ambiguous as to the skills and experience [Kraatz] was to
provide as general manager of the Dealership to develop and
maintain the dealership." The trial court then heard extrinsic
evidence "to clarify the intentions of the parties with respect
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to the skills, personality traits and management skills fKraatz]
was to provide as general manager." However, in the recitals of
the agreement, the parties recognized that Kraal:2 alreadypossessed all the necessary skills and traits to be a general
manager: "WHEREAS, [Kraatz] has. skills, personality traits and
management skills, which are conducive to development and
maintenance of such interpersonal relations, management of
personnel, financing and sales and operating an automobile
dealership."
(Emphasis added,) Thus, the trial court did not
need to hear extrinsic evidence to determine whether Kraatz had
the requisite skills, personality traits, and management skills
to manage the business.
Furthermore, in Article I of the contract, the parties
detailed Kraatz's duties as general manager:
(a) [Kraatz] shall be employed as
General Manager . . . and shall provide dayto-day management over the operations of the
Dealership . , , , [Kraatz] shall have
responsibility and authority over all aspects
of the daily operations.
(b) The duties of [Kraatz] shall
include, but not be limited to, the
responsibility to provide management training
to persons selected by [Heritage] to enable
said persons to become qualified dealers or
managers acceptable to American Honda,
Incorporated. „ „ «,
(c) [Kraatz] shall contribute his best
professional skill to perform the Services at
all times for the business and benefit of
[Heritage.]

,

In view of the clear provisions of the contract, we hold that the
trial court erred in determining the contract is ambiguous •
When "the language of the contract is unambiguous, 'then the
parties' intentions must be determined solely from the language
of the contract.' n Tavlor v Hansen. 958 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998) (quoting Ward v. Tnte.rmountain Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d
264, 268 (Utah 1995)). Also, " • the ordinary and usual meaning of
the words used is given effect. ' The ordinary meaning of
contract terms is often best determined through standard, nonlegal dictionaries." Warburton v. Vir-girna Beach Fed. Sav. &
LQ&n, 899 P. 2d 779, 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Berman v.
Berman. 749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1988)).
Here/ the contract obligated Heritage to pay Kraatz for five
years. Article II of the contract: provides that Heritage could

Q71n44-CA
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terminate Kraatz only for fraud, dishonesty, refusal "to fulfill
his employment responsibilities described in Article I of this
Agreement," or disability. The trial court concluded that "given
the language [in Article I] requiring the performance of the
service, the interpretation of refusal consistent with this
paragraph is that [Kraatz]' s failure to perform the services
under the Agreement is a breach of the Agreement and constitutes
cause for termination-11 We disagree. Under its plain meaning,
"refuse" means "to show or express a positive unwillingness to do
or comply with-" Webster's Third New Int'1 Dictionary 1910
(1986). Kraatz did not refuse to do anything specified in
Article I. Although the trial court found that Heritage fired
Kraatz for his "refusal to work Saturdays when scheduled by B.
Wilkinson," the contract expressly provided that Kraatz "shall
have responsibility and authority over all aspects of the daily
operations -" Nothing in the contract suggests that anyone other
than Kraatz would have authority to set work schedules- Thus,
Kraatz's refusal to work Saturdays^is not cause for his
termination.
Our conclusion remains the same even if we depart from the
plain meaning of "refuse" and accept the trial court's
interpretation that "refuse" means "fail." "Failure" means
"omission of performance of an action or task; [especially] :
neglect of an assigned, expected, or appropriate action." Tc^L at
815, The trial court found that Heritage fired Kraatz for
numerous failures. For example, the trial court determined that
Heritage fired Kraatz for "failure to make a profit." However,
the contract provides simply that the general manager "shall
provide day-to-day management over the operations of the
Dealership" and "shall have responsibility and authority over all
aspects of the daily operations." The duties of a general
manager,, as specified in the contract, do not include making a
profit.
The
included
however,
question
manager.

trial court stated that Kraatz admitted that his duties
making a profit. A close reading of the record,
shows that Kraatz 1 s response to the profitability
was consistent with his contractual duties as general
Q:
[The general manager is] responsible for
the production of income from the dealership,
right?
A: Overseeing those people that generate the
sales within the dealership, I think it's his
responsibility, yes.
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Thus, the contract does not authorize Heritage to terminate
Kraatz for cause for failing to make a profit.
The trial court also found that Heritage fired Kraatz for
his "failure to train J. Wilkinson and Jeff Gorringe." The
contract expressly provides that M[t]he duties and
responsibilities of [Kraatz] shall include, but not be limited
to, the responsibility to provide management training to persons
selected by [Heritage] to enable said persons to become qualified
dealers or managers acceptable to American Honda, Incorporated."
The record contains no evidence suggesting that J. Wilkinson or
Jeff Gorringe were unacceptable to American Honda, Incorporated.
Further, even if Kraatz had, up to that point, failed to train
the named*individuals according to Honda's standards, he still
had thirty-three months left on his contract to complete the
training. Although the record shows that J. Wilkinson may have
been difficult to train, it does not reflect that Kraatz failed
to train him during the contract term. Thus, failure to train is
not cause for termination.
We have considered Heritage's cross-appeal and the other
reasons mentioned as cause for termination, and conclude, as a
matter of law, that they have no merit. See Duncan v. Howard.
918 P.2d 888, 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (noting court may decline
to address arguments without merit on appeal).
We hold that the trial court erred in considering extrinsic
evidence because the language of the contract is unambiguous.
Our review of the record reveals no evidentiary basis for
terminating Kraatz for cause. We therefore reverse and remand
for a determination of Kraatz f s damages under the contract,
including reasonable attorney fees.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

WE CONCUR:

widifeifT^r f i l l i n g s . Judged 3<?
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ADDENDUM B

1

here.

We're doing questions and answers.

2
3

Mr. Zundel, if you're finished with the witness,
you may be seated.

4

You may cross-examine.

5

MR. WINDER:

6
7
8
9

Thank you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. WINDER:
Q

Now, let's start with your first sheet.

compensation per contract.

10

A

I do.

11

Q

Profit sharing.

12

A

I am.

13

Q

Okay.

14

Expected

You got that in front of you?

Are you with me?

Now, when Tony was the GM, there was no

profit to pay him under this column, right?

15

A

In 1992 we have no profit.

16

Q

And you're aware that the dealership made 5,000

17

bucks in '91 and lost a bunch of money in '90, right?

18

A

I don't have those numbers.

19

Q

You did not go back?

20

A

Didn't go back.

21

Q

Okay, but as far as '92 is concerned, there's no

22

profit to pay because the dealership, Heritage Honda, didn't

23

make any money, right?

24

A

Correct.

25

Q

Okay.

Now, what you've done here is you made an
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assumption that what Larry H. Miller did with the dealership,
Tony could do with the dealership, right?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

A

Sixty percent.

Q

Okay, and the name changed.

Now, Miller bought Heritage Honda, right?

It's Larry H. Miller

Honda, right?
A

I don't know the exact name.

Q

It's not Heritage Honda anymore.
MR. ZUNDEL:
THE COURT:
MR. WINDER:

Q

Well, objection, Judge.
The witness doesn't know, he said.
Okay, thank you.

(By Mr. Winder)

Now, this is a $108,000 item that

your brother-in-law under your calculation ought to be entitled to, right?
A

Yes.

Q

Now, what you've done on the schedule is you've

taken the deal Miller cut, and I'm talking about A-1.2 which
is your backup schedule to this, you've taken the deal that
Larry made and you've made adjustments to it, right?
A

Yes.

Q

So you want the benefit of Miller's running the

dealership, but you don't want the deal he made, right?
A

We felt those adjustments were appropriate under

the circumstances.

I'm not sure I agree with your
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1

conclusion, Counsel.

2

them for the rent which we felt was excessive and for the

3

purchase agreement so yes, we took the actual numbers, but we

4

made two adjustments.

5
6

Q

Okay.

We took the actual numbers and adjusted

Larry Miller didn't think the rent was

excessive, did he?

7

A

Well, I don't know that he has commented on the

8

rent.

9

have been doing that for tax planning purposes, for estate

10

planning purposes.

11
12

I can't answer what he thought was excessive.

Q

He may

I'm not sure for what purpose.

When he took over he charged the dealership 48,000

a month in rent.

He raised it, right?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Okay, and you're saying I don't agree with Larry

16

A

That's right.

17

Q

Okay.

15

did.

My question to you, sir, was, you want the

18

benefits, the fruits of what Larry Miller produced, i.e., the

19

profit, but you don't want the deal he made, right?

20

A

That's your conclusion.

21

Q

All right.

22

53,000.

Now, he raised the rent again to

You see that on your spreadsheet A-1.2?

23

A

Yes, and I've already commented on that.

24

Q

No, I didn't ask if you've commented on it.

25

asked if you saw it.
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1

A

And I said yes.

2

Q

And you're aware that what Larry Miller did is he

3

went in and bought additional acreage next to his West Valley

4

used car location; you're aware of that?

5

A

I'm aware of that.

6

Q

And you're aware that through additional acreage he

7

increased the inventory on his West Valley lot; did you know

8

that?

9

A

I don't know that he increased the inventory.

10

Q

Okay, and do you know that because he increased the

11

inventory because he had more land, he made more money sell-

12

ing used cars; did you know that?

13

A

I did not check that.

14

Q

But you don't want to recognize Larry Miller's

15

determination of what the rent ought to be on your schedule,

16

right?

17

A

No, and I've already indicated why.

18

Q

Okay.

Now, let's talk about these adjustments at

19

the bottom of A-1.2, deferred compensation, noncompete agree-

20

ment.

21

A

Does Counselor mean A-1,7?

22

Q

No, A-1.2.

23

A

Okay.

24

Q

Your adjustments.

25

A

A-1.21?

Same sheet we're on.
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1

Q

Right.

Your adjustments.

Larry Miller agreed to

2

pay deferred compensation and a noncompete to Bry Wilkinson,

3

right?

4

A

Yes.

5

Q

And you've decided that the interest he's paying

6

ought to be adjusted out, right?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Okay, and you've also adjusted out an alimony pay-

9

ment to one of Bry's wives, right?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Okay.

Now, let's just look at the year 1994 for a

12

minute, and you made a couple of other adjustments and an

13

amortization adjustment and a BMW car allowance.

14

assume for a minute that you don't make these adjustments and

15

it's up to his Honor to decide whether or not these adjust-

16

ments are acceptable, but just assume for a minute you don't

17

make these.

18

I'd like to

Tony's 10 percent of any profit over 280,000 in

19

1994 without these adjustments would be $4,000.

20

a calculator, I had an advantage.

21

asked it, but if you'd like a calculator or whatever, I'd

22

like you to either agree or disagree with me.

I ran the numbers before I

23

A

Well, then, give me a calculator.

24

Q

Okay.

25

—

If you need

How fancy do you want it?

I just have one

oh, here, here's an accountant type calculator.
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1

A

2

Never mind, I have my own.
Now, are you talking about backing out the business

3

purchase adjustments, or are you talking about backing out

4

all adjustments?

5

Q

6

adjustments.

7

A

Including the rent?

8

Q

That you have —

9

I'm talking about backing out all of the

no, not just your adjustments at

the bottom of the schedule, deferred comp, noncompete, ali-

10

mony, and then the amortization and the car allowance.

11

think you've got some totals there.

12

A

13
14

I

Yeah, I do. What I need is a pencil.
I come up, without those adjustments, I come up

with a $12,559 adjustment.

15

Q

And if we put the rent in, it's going to be even

16

lower.

17

very big number, is it?

I don't want you to do that.

It's not going to be a

18

A

No.

19

Q

Okay, so if you compare the deal Miller made with

20

the profits that Miller made, your brother-in-law gets a few

21

thousand dollars for '94, right?

22
23

A

Depending upon your —

if we use your calculations,

that's correct.

24

Q

We don't make your adjustments, sir.

25

A

That is correct.
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Q

Thank you.

Now, let's go back to your first

spreadsheet, and let's talk about the Sports Mall.

The

agreement, your brother-in-law's agreement is attached to
your work papers.

You have in your second Sports Mall column

an amount of usage, right, 137.50 per month?
A

That's family usage.

Q

Family usage.

You're aware, are you not, that the

agreement, Schedule A of the agreement says the company shall
pay membership fees, monthly dues and monthly charges relating to business use for the membership, right?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay, and what you put in here is family usage.

A

Yes.

Q

All right.

Now, Hidden Valley, in the summertime

$457 a month is six rounds of golf, right?
A

I have my work paper that shows the rounds of golf

and cart fees.
Q

Three rounds, two people, six rounds, one person,

right?
A

Well, do you want me to return to the work paper?

Q

If you'd like, if you're having any doubt about it.

A

Okay.

Q

Six rounds of golf.

A

Let me just make sure.

That was three golf trips

taking two guests and renting a cart?
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1
2
3

THE COURT: Was there a provision for tees?

Did we

omit tees?
Q

(By Mr. Winder)

You're aware that the contract

4

Schedule A says company shall pay membership fees, monthly

5

dues and monthly charges related to business use of the

6

membership, right?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Are you aware that Mr. Kraatz never in the 27

9
10

months he was with Heritage ever used that country club for
business purposes?

11
12

MR. ZUNDEL:

Object to the question, Judge.

The

form of the question is argumentative.

13

MR. WINDER:

It is, it is argumentative.

14

THE COURT: Well, this is cross-examination,

15

Counsel.

The form of the question is acceptable to me.

It's

16

cross.

17

Q

(By Mr. Winder) Are you aware of that?

18

A

My understanding is that Mr. Kraatz did use the

Overruled.

19

club and did play golf with customers, bankers, et cetera,

20

for business purposes.

21

Q

And you have that understanding how?

22

A

From Mr. Kraatz. Now, he did not use -.- he did not

23

obtain the membership, but he would either be with

24

Mr. Wilkinson or other bankers playing golf probably on their

25

memberships.
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1

Q

And that's something that Mr. Kraatz told you?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

And is that reflected in your work paper schedule?

4

A

Well, the information in terms of the number of

5

golf trips and guests and everything came from conversations

6

with Mr. Kraatz, yes.

7

Q

And is it reflected in your work papers?

8

A

That conversation?

9

Q

Yes.

10

A

No.

11

Q

Now, St. George house reimbursement.

You're aware,

12

are you not, that in the 27 months that Mr. Kraatz worked at

13

Heritage, the home in St. George was not sold?

14

A

Let me respond to your previous question.

In my

15

work papers it says per discussion with Tony Kraatz, addi-

16

tional usage fee incurred monthly for green fees were the

17

average and we go from there, so we have indicated that it

18

was per discussion with Mr. Kraatz.

19

Q

But my question, what we were talking about is his

20

usage.

What your work papers say is additional usage in the

21

summer.

22

with Mr. Kraatz in which he told you what his business usage

23

was at Hidden Valley Country Club?

24
25

A
did.

My question to you is, did you have a discussion

I did not personally, but I'm assuming my staff
I have not indicated that on that work paper.
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1

Q

Thank you.

Now, St. George, $2,210.53, not a big

2

number considering all these numbers, but house reimburse-

3

ment, you've calculated.

4

contract that deals with St. George in Schedule C says —

5

I'm at paragraph 6 —

6

residence being constructed for employee is available for

7

occupancy and continuing thereafter for a period of not to

8

exceed six months, duplicate housing expenses incurred by

9

employee prior to the sale of employee's residence in

10

St. George, Utah.

You're aware, are you not, that the
and

commencing on the date on which the new

You're aware of that language?

11

A

Yes.

12

Q

And for 27 months Mr. Kraatz received this while at

13

Heritage and you've calculated it to continue for another

14

almost four months after his employment, right?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Okay.

Now, there's nothing in his agreement, this

17

employment agreement that says he gets over 30 months of

18

payment on his house in St. George, right?

19

A

Correct.

20

Q

Now, it does say in his employment agreement, going

21

over to your column health costs, that he's to get certain

22

health costs, right?

23

unreimbursed medical per year.

That is in there up to five grand

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Are you aware that Mr. Kraatz had discussions with
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1

Mr. Wilkinson in which Mr. Wilkinson said, "We can't afford

2

to pay the medical reimbursement part"?

3

that?

4

A

Are you aware of

My understanding of that conversation is a little

5

bit different.

My understanding was that although the

6

dealership would not pay it at that time, that they would

7

make it up down the road.

8

Q

Who told you that?

9

A

Mr. Kraatz.

10

Q

When?

11

A

I can't recall.

12

Q

Is that reflected anywhere in your work papers?

13

A

I don't believe so.

14

Q

Okay, so Mr. Kraatz gets the benefit on St. George

15

of something that isn't in the contract for 30 months, but he

16

doesn't want to suffer the detriment of something that isn't

17

in the contract, i.e., we're not going to pay medical reim-

18

bursement, right?

19
20
21

A

Doesn't want is a subjective, Counselor, but I've

already told you my understanding of that conversation.
Q

All right.

Christmas bonus, maybe the smallest

22

number of all, 500 bucks. What's the basis for the Christmas

23

bonus in here?

24

A

Past history.

25

Q

Excuse me?
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1

A

Past history.

2

Q

And does that relate to your knowledge to the

3

employee handbook?

4

A

Relates to conversations with Mr. Kraatz.

5

Q

And did those conversations say that the basis for

6
7
8

this is the employee handbook, this claim?
A

I don't recall him in the conversation referring to

the employee handbook.

9

Q

Okay.

Now, from Jazz tickets to retirement contri-

10

butions to —

11

those items past there on your spreadsheet are referred to in

12

the employment agreement, right?

well, starting with Christmas bonus, none of

13

A

Correct.

14

Q

Okay, now, you prepared a Schedule E-2 on Universal

15

Warranty income that takes actual sales of warranties made by

16

Larry H. Miller, right?

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

A

Well, I've indicated on the work paper exactly

which actual sales I've taken.
Q

Okay.

If you want to look, and I don't want to put

words in your mouth —
A

Okay.

We've taken May of '92 through November of

'92, yes.
Q

Now, there's nothing in the employment contract

24

that says that Mr. Wilkinson can't sell his dealership,

25

right?
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1
2

A

I didn't see anything in there that referred to

that.

3

Q

And there's nothing in his contract that says that

4

anybody who purchases the dealership has to continue any

5

benefits that are not contained in that agreement, right?

6

MR. ZUNDEL:

Your Honor, I object at this point.

7

The question assumes facts not in evidence and facts that are

8

contrary to undisputed facts. The dealership wasn't sold.

9

The stock was sold.

The dealership is the same corporation

10

as it was when Mr. Kraatz was employed.

11

name, that's all, but the legal entity's the same and this is

12

something that assumes that the dealership itself has been

13

sold.

14

It's got a different

It's got a new —
THE COURT:

Well, whatever the question assumes,

15

I'm not sure that it's helpful to me to know what this wit-

16

ness's observations are about the effect of a sale.

17

MR. WINDER:

18

THE COURT: All right.

19
20

Q

I'll move on.

(By Mr. Winder)

alternative study.

Let's turn, Mr. Wisan, to your

Do you have that in front of you?

21

A

Work paper K.

22

Q

J. J. W. income analysis.

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Work paper K.

25

A

Yes, I have that in front of me.
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1

Q

All right.

Now, under the column "Percentage of

2

Gross Profit," when you get to the bottom there's a grand

3

total of a hundred and sixty-two thousand bucks; you see

4

that, right?

5

A

Okay,

6

Q

All right.

7

J. J. entitled to?

8
9
10

A

13

This information was taken right off of the actual

pay records, so I'm assuming that this is the amount that he
was entitled to.

11
12

What percentage of the gross profit was

Q
that?

And my question to you, sir, was what percentage is
You're drawing.

A

It's a —

it's a little bit of a computation.

It

14

was —

15

dealership profit and then there was an adjustment and I

16

believe it was Mrs. Green —

17

salary was taken out of that and then the calculation turned

18

out to be in essence a 10 percent calculation.

19

it's approximately 10 percent, but it was after the

Q

or I'm not sure of her name,

Okay, so what we've done here is on the one hand we

20

have Tony Kraatz and he has an employment agreement that says

21

I get 10 percent after 280,000, right?

22

A

Correct.

23

Q

Okay, and on the other hand, we have an agreement

24

for Jeff Wilkinson that he gets a flat 10 percent subject to

25

Helen Green adjustments, right?
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A

Yes.

Q

And you're comparing those two?

A

It is what it is.

Q

Okay, and it's also under Larry Miller's operation,

right?
A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

Now, you have in here car bonus.

Can you

tell me, to get a car bonus at Larry H. Miller Honda, do you
have to be a stockholder?
A

I don't know.

I did not inquire of Larry H.

Miller's employees.
Q

Can you tell me, to get a warranty bonus whether

you have to be a stockholder?
A

I don't know.

Q

Can you tell me, to get the LHM leasing amounts

whether you have to be a stockholder.
A

Don't know.

Q

Can you tell me, whether to get the other amounts

you have to be a stockholder?
A

Don't know.

Q

J. J. is and was a stockholder; you know that?

A

Yes.

Q

Tony was not?

A

Yes.
MR. WINDER:

I have no other questions.
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1
2

THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Zundel?

3

MR. ZUNDEL:

A little.

4

THE COURT:

Pardon me?

5

MR. ZUNDEL:

A little.

6

THE COURT:

7
8
9

Is there any redirect,

Okay.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. ZUNDEL:
Q

Mr. Winder asked you, he said you're assuming that

10

Tony Kraatz would run the dealership as well as Larry Miller,

11

Doesn't this calculation really assume that Tony Kraatz can

12

run the dealership as well as J. J. Wilkinson?

13

MR. WINDER:

14

THE COURT:

15

18

Sustained.

He's your witness,

remember?

16
17

Objection, leading.

MR. ZUNDEL:
Q

Yeah.

(By Mr. Zundel) Who's the general manager of

Heritage?

19

A

My understanding is it's Jeff Wilkinson.

20

Q

And Larry Miller isn't the general manager, is he?

21

A

No.

22

Q

These assumptions in this that you made, did you

23

assume that the corporate entity has not changed?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Except in name only.
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ADDENDUM C

1
2
3
4
5

Q

That is not a proper entry for the $200,000 the way

it is, is it?
A

It would probably be better reflected as receivable

as opposed to an advance.
Q

Because a bank or anybody looking at a financial

6

statement might want to know whether it's a loan to a princi-

7

pal or a loan to a third-party or a disinterested party;

8

isn't that right?

9

A

10

Yes.
MR. ZUNDEL:

11

witness, your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. WINDER:

15

17

Very well.

You may cross-examine,

Mr. Winder.

14

16

I have no further questions for this

Thank you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. WINDER:
Q

Mr. Christian, let's start where the examination

18

finished off.

We're talking about the financial statement

19

line item 297. Do you know if this 200,000 was repaid?

20

A

Yes, it was repaid.

21

Q

By whom?

22

A

It was repaid by Bry Wilkinson.

23

Q

Does putting the 200,000 on line item 297 in any

24
25

way distort the bottom line picture?
A

No, because it's included in the same subcaption,
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1
2

total other assets.
Q

It would be if it were included above.

You were asked, Mr. Christian, about a —

3

talked about an IRS audit.

4

was audited, what years.

you

Tell me for when the dealership

5

A

Dealership was audited for 1989 and 1990.

6

Q

And out of that dealership or out of those two

7
8
9

audits, what adjustments, if any, did the IRS ask to be made?
A

As I recall, they were three items which we

addressed as a resulted of that audit.

The audit was quite

10

extensive.

At that time an automobile specialty group was

11

created and Gordon Stewart was the head of that, so we spent

12

a lot of time, but as I recall, the only three items that

13

were ultimately adjusted were a $33,333 payment which'was

14

paid to FSLIC, I believe, in 1990. The issue on that amount

15

centered on whether or not it was legitimately deductible by

16

the dealership.

17

small amount of legal fees.

18

was, and my recollection is it was in the $2,000 range, and

19

then an adjustment for personal entertainment types of items,

20

personal expense type items that hadn't been properly treated

21

on Mr. Wilkinson's return, and I believe that amount was

22

about $3500.

23

Q

The other two amounts, as I recall, were a
I don't remember what the number

Now, as to the FSLIC, before the IRS audit, had you

24

expressed any opinion as financial counsel for the company as

25

to whether or not that payment could be deducted by the
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1

company?

2

A

Yes, I had.

3

Q

And what was your opinion?

4

A

My feeling was it was legitimately deductible by

5

the company.

6

Q

And in the IRS audit, with did the IRS say?

7

A

The IRS took the position —

I should back up and

8

say we took the position that Mr. Wilkinson was representing

9

the dealership and in fact sold cars as a result of his

10

involvement on the board of directors of FSLIC —

or on the

11

board of directors of State Savings.

12

as it may, he was still acting personally, that he'd received

13

a couple hundred dollars from director's fees which he

14

received personally and that the payment of that expense was

15

personal as opposed to a dealership expense.

The IRS argued be that

16

Q

And did you contest the IRS position?

17

A

Well, we discussed it with them.

Frankly, we ended

18

up conceding it because it was a situation where from a tax

19

standpoint, we received a better benefit by conceding it.

20

Q

Why is that?

21

A

Well, when it was deducted by the dealership,

22

Mr. Wilkinson was the only one of the stockholders in a

23

fairly high tax bracket.

24

ship, he only received sixty some —

25

cent of that deduction.

When it was deducted by the dealerI think it was 68 per-

By conceding the deduction, they
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turned around and adjusted Mr. Wilkinson's return and gave
him a hundred percent of the deduction personally as opposed
to 68 percent that came to the dealership, so from an IRS
negotiating point of view, it was not an amount we really
lost on.

It was of no consequence.
MR. WINDER:

Thank you.

MR. ZUNDEL:

Thank you.

Nothing further.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ZUNDEL:
Q

Just quickly, Mr. Christian, better to have the

money than the deduction, right?
A

Well, certainly.

Q

Okay.

You said it was of no consequence.

You were

talking about tax wise, but the $33,000 payment made to the
FSLIC on Mr. Wilkinson's behalf affected the dealership
dollar for dollar $33,000.
A

That's correct.

Q

All right.

Now, how about the —

you talked about

the IRS being an extensive audit, having done an extensive
audit.

They missed Banner Life in 1990, didn't they?
THE COURT:

Well, he said extensive.

He didn't say

necessarily accurate.
MR. ZUNDEL:

That's my point.

THE COURT: All right.
Q

(By Mr. Zundel)

You listed three things.
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ADDENDUM D

1

(Whereupon, Daniel J, Hartmann, was placed under

2

oath and testified, which testimony has been previously tran-

3

scribed and is contained within a separate transcript

4

volume.)

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. WINDER:

7

Yes.

Jeff Jensen.

I need to go get

him, Judge.

8
9

You can call your next witness.

JEFFREY BOB JENSEN,
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Defendants,

10

having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as

11

follows:

12

THE WITNESS:

13

J-e-f-f-r-e-y B-o-b J-e-n-s-e-n.

14
15

My name is Jeffrey Bob Jensen,

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. WINDER:

16

Q

Mr. Jensen, where are you employed?

17

A

At Jensen, Barrett & Keddington.

18

Q

What's your profession?

19

A

As a certified public accountant.

20

Q

Do you practice that profession for the Larry H.

21

Miller Group?

22

A

Yes, I do.

23

Q

At my request have you prepared a summary off of

24

the 13th month statements for Heritage Honda for the years

25

1985 through 1995?
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A

Yes, I have.

Q

And what's the 13th month statement?

A

Thirteenth month statement is the dealer's finan-

cial statement that is prepared after the normal December
31st statement that has year-end adjustments.

It's used to

prepare tax returns and financial statements.
THE COURT:

We already have, Mr. Winder, this docu-

ment received as Exhibit 208.
MR. WINDER:

Well, we had a problem yesterday at

the close of business that's necessitated the calling of this
witness.

It will only take a minute to correct math on three

items and that's all I'm going to ask him to do.
THE COURT:

This gentleman was not in that regard,

then, identified yesterday as one of the proposed witnesses,
but this is for a technical correction?
MR. WINDER:
THE COURT:
Q

It is.
All right, then, go ahead.

(By Mr. Winder)

Show you what's been marked as

Exhibit 593, Mr. Jensen, and that is the compilation, the
summary that you've prepared?
A

Yes, it is.

Q

Are there any errors that you discovered on this

summary?
A

Yes, there are.

Q

The errors are in which column and row?
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1

A

If you go to row —

2

Q

Right.

3

A

The total expenses per car down towards the bottom,

4

Q

For what year?

6

A

For 1993.

MR. WINDER:

9

THE COURT:

10

MR. ZUNDEL:

11

13
14

For 1994 it should be $1633, and 1995 it

should be $1840.

8

12

—

second to the last line, should be calculated at $1744.

5

7

or the column that says 1993

I have no further questions.
Very well.

Mr. Zundel?

Thank you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. ZUNDEL:
Q

Mr. Jensen, there's also an error in the upper

figures regarding gross profit per unit, isn't there?

15

A

Gross profit per unit?

16

Q

Yes.

17

A

I don't believe so.

18

Q

Well, let me show you the 1993, for example.

19

December 13th statement, should we look at that?

20

believe is attached —

21

1993

Which I

well, it's Exhibit 298.

Are you quickly making a calculation?

22

A

I am making a calculation.

23

Q

You realize what the error was is that you, in

24

determining the number of units, the denominator, you

25

asserted that you were using all of the units, meaning retail
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used cars and wholesale used cars, that's the assertion, but
in fact, you goofed and only used the retail cars, right?

on

A

As I look at it now, yes, you are correct.

Q

All right.

A

I can make the changes if you would like.

Q

This Exhibit 593 has no value whatsoever as a

Are you prepared to make the changes

—

comparison with that error in it, does it?
A

For the used car sales I would —

as it stands, I

would agree.
Q

All right, and the error on the total expenses per

car, once you look at it, there's no particular conclusion to
be drawn from that, kind of the same from year to year, even
before or after Larry Miller took over.
MR. WINDER:
scope.

Objection, your Honor, beyond the

I didn't ask him to draw any conclusions from the

numbers.
THE COURT:

Well, I will allow the witness to

answer that question just in keeping with establishing the
reasons why he's been called here.
You may respond if you're able, Mr. Jensen.
THE WITNESS:

The total expenses per car would be

correct based on the correction that I have made per car.
MR. ZUNDEL:

Okay.

I have no further questions,

Judge.
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THE COURT:

Very well.

Is there anything further,

Mr. Winder?
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. WINDER >
Q

Mr. Jensen , how long would it take to make the

adjustment on the used cars?
A

Less than five minutes.
MR. ZUNDEL :

Your Honor, we —

I'm happy to give it

to you sometime. We don't have to take the time —
MR. WINDER :

You've got it?

MR. ZUNDEL

I'll put these back.

THE COURT:

Give us the numbers.

Well, then, if there's nothing further

of this> witness, we''LI release him at this time, gentlemen.
MR. WINDER :

Sure.

THE COURT: Mr. Jensen, you're free to go, sir.
Thank you.
Call your next witness.
MR. WINDER :
MS. FALK:

Okay.

I call J. J. Wilkinson, Jeffrey

Wilkinson.
JEFFREY JOSEPH WILKINSON,
having been previously sworn, resumed the stand and testified
furthei• as follows:
THE COURT:

You're still under oath, Mr. Wilkinson.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
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